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ABSTRACT 
 
 Contradictory management objectives in adjacent jurisdictions can affect transboundary 
wolves and their associated socio-ecological systems. Elite interviews and case study 
methodology were used in this thesis to explore three transboundary wolf management 
agreements, their effectiveness, and their impacts on wolves, ecosystems and stakeholders. 
Separate agreements between the State of Alaska and: Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, 
and Denali National Park and Preserve, and an agreement between Italy and Switzerland show 
that despite a diversity of socio-ecological contexts, approaches, and hierarchical level of actors, 
transboundary wolf agreements are prone to ephemerality. The ephemerality of these 
agreements appears to be due primarily to institutional path dependency, and to political 
tension between management entities.  The impacts of these agreements and their cessation, 
on socio-ecological systems are limited by the agreements’ limited scopes. The agreements do 
however figure incrementally into larger trends, especially including changes in rural and urban 
identities, and in large carnivore management discourse. I argue that a diversity of wolf 
management approaches across a landscape, and the inherent conflict between management 
entities preserves adaptive capacity by preventing one size fits all prescriptions based on 
incomplete knowledge. Assuming no acute state of emergency, incremental rather than 
transformational change is more equitable to diverse stakeholders; allowing public perception, 
policy, and scientific knowledge to shift concurrently. The cases also suggest that facilitating 
trans-entity conversation and coordination at multiple levels would support understanding, and 
increase the prevalence of creative agreements contributing to amenable, incremental change. 
Landscape Conservation Cooperatives are put forth as a potential platform or template for this 
facilitation. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In the mid-2000s, I was living in Zurich, Switzerland. I spent virtually all of my free time in the 
Alps. The Alps deserve their romantic reputation. At lower altitudes, thousands of years of 
agriculture have manicured forests cleanly around pastures. Above the tree line, one encounters 
domestic sheep and goat herds on rocky and snowy terrain. Wild chamois appear and disappear 
on impossible inclines. Idyllic mountain villages speckle dramatic mountainous landscapes. In 
villages and cities pictures and place names connote the presence of wildlife prominently, 
including bears and wolves; however, large carnivores have been largely absent from the 
landscape for nearly two centuries. In recent decades, however, native wolves, bears and lynx, 
long extirpated, from the vast majority of the Alps, have begun to reappear. The first individual 
wolves began to reenter Switzerland from Italy in 1995, 174 years after the last known wild wolf 
was shot. The first wild bear of modern times was seen in Switzerland in 2005, 101 years after 
the last one was shot. Lynx were reintroduced in 1971 after having been extirpated 56 years 
earlier. 
 
 The nascent, natural recolonization by wolves of their former range has recurrently made 
front-page news. This media attention highlights the complex interplay between cultural values, 
the natural world, and politics. Environmental NGOs and many biologists celebrated the wolf’s 
return, on the evening news. Many shepherds, other small-livestock breeders, and hunters 
prominently expressed the opposite reaction. Some opponents of the wolf’s return continue to 
call for its re-extirpation. The vocal conflict between proponents and opponents of wolf 
recolonization captivated the public. Then I moved to Fairbanks, Alaska.  
 
 Fairbanks is a small city, by international standards, in Interior Alaska. It boasts impressive 
extremes in climate, and access to the vast wild areas of the Interior.  ‘Access’ is a misnomer, 
actually. Villages and towns in the regions are generally small, far apart, and frequently 
inaccessible by road. The term ‘pristine wilderness’ more appropriately applies to Interior Alaska 
than most anywhere else. A full suite of native fauna complete the picture. Curiously, it seemed 
to me, Alaskans were having similar wolf-related conversations to those taking place in 
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Switzerland. In Alaska, proponents and opponents of wolf-control clashed in public forums. 
Opponents of wolf-control coined the dysphemism ‘moose farm’ to criticize the killing of wolves 
to boost prey numbers for hunters.  Proponents of wolf-control often claimed ‘wolf huggers’ 
failed to understand wolf-control’s virtues.  
 
 The Alps and Alaska have starkly different socio-ecological situations. Despite these 
differences, ideological and rhetorical themes such as the rural - urban divide, tradition, food, 
rights, and safety appear in large-carnivore-management discourse in both the Alps, and Alaska. 
In both regions, the conflict seemed to play out most vehemently around borders. This makes 
sense. Wolves do not care about jurisdictional divides; people do, though. Wolves as a flagship 
species and charismatic mega-fauna can drastically affect stakeholders (e.g. symbolically and 
emotionally, and practically by affecting hunting opportunities) and natural systems (e.g. by 
altering regional biodiversity, water quality).  Due to these effects, transboundary wolves can 
confound attempts to meet contradictory management objectives on opposing sides of 
jurisdictional boundaries. Confoundedness can manifest into undesirably confrontational 
relationships between management agencies and/ or user-groups. Confoundedness can also 
characterize agreements over wolf management. Even when transboundary wolf management 
agreements do come about, they tend to be ephemeral. 
 
 In this thesis, I examine three transboundary wolf management agreements; how they were 
created, and ultimately what causes their ephemerality. I conclude that two factors cause these 
agreements to cease to function. First, agreement makers lack either commitment or the ability 
to commit to the agreement at their decision-making level. This inability to commit is a product 
of institutional priorities and hierarchies. Second, the agreements are unimportant in the 
context of larger issues. I discuss the impacts of the agreements and their short-lived-ness on: 
wolves, their ecoystems, and stakeholders. I discuss how these agreements contribute to the 
incremental evolution of trends. Finally, I discuss the challenges in creating lasting and/ or 
effective agreements, and I postulate potential ways forward. 
 
3 
 
Specifically, this thesis consists of three case studies exploring the governance of wolves in 
transboundary regions. The first case study examines wolf governance over subnational/ 
jurisdictional boundaries within the State of Alaska between Denali National Park and Preserve 
(Denali), and the State of Alaska. The second case study examines wolf governance over 
subnational/ jurisdictional boundaries within the State of Alaska between Yukon-Charley Rivers 
National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), and the State of Alaska. The third case study explores 
governance over Italian - Swiss national boundary in the Western Alps. 
 
Large carnivores other than wolves (e.g. bears and lynx) also figure into large predator 
issues such as predator control, extirpation, and recolonization and reintroduction 
(Breitenmoser, 1998; Boertje, Keeck, & Paragi, 2010). However, for the sake of manageability, 
the focus of this study is solely on wolves. The extirpation of all large carnivores in the Western 
Alps case study area took place more-or-less simultaneously. Subsequently, Lynx have been 
reintroduced on a limited basis (Breitenmoser, 1998). Natural recolonization of the area by 
bears and wolves has taken place at different paces, following different patterns (Breitenmoser, 
1998; Linnell, Salvatori, & Boitani, 2008). In all three case studies, the agreements that I examine 
focus on the governance of wolves; where other large carnivore species are addressed as part of 
an agreement, I have included that information.  
 
1.2  RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION 
 
1.2.1  BOUNDARIES 
Studying transboundary resource governance is important for a number of reasons. 
Individual resources are interrelated with ecosystems (Leopold, 1979); and ecosystems often, if 
not always, extend beyond political borders (López-Hoffman, Varady, Flessa, & Balvanera, 2012). 
Management actions on one side of a jurisdictional boundary can drastically affect natural 
resources on the other side. These effects can be to high profile resources, priority resources, 
and larger natural systems. These effects can be felt immediately and well beyond the 
jurisdictional border of a management entity; and can affect that neighboring entity’s attempts 
to manage natural resources within its own jurisdiction.  
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Humans depend on these functioning natural systems, for example for ecosystem services 
such as food, and climate regulation (Chapin III, Folke, & Kofinas, Managing Ecosystems 
Sustainability: The Key Role of Resilience, 2009). Humans also value various aspects of the 
natural world for less tangible reasons (Woodgate & Redclift, 1998; Freyfogle E. , 2006). Though 
understandings and definitions of ‘natural’ vary widely (Freyfogle E. , 2006; Nankoong, 2008; 
Kleese, 2002), nature and our interactions with nature are valued consciously and 
subconsciously for spiritual, recreational, identity-related, existence value, and other reasons 
(Nankoong, 2008; Kleese, 2002; Reedy-Maschner, 2010; Anahita & Mix, 2006).  
 
The history of territories, borders and the formation of states is long, complex and 
increasingly hazy as the perspective is extended back in time (Glyn, 2004). There have been wars 
and agreements over transboundary resources throughout history (Acemoglu, Golosov, 
Tsyvinski, & Yared, 2011) There have also been wars and agreements over borders themselves 
(Brotton, 2012). However, ‘the grey area beyond the border’ on maps seems to rema in a 
common trope.  
 
Land management entities face growing demands due to: increasingly complex and inclusive 
understandings of geophysical processes (Jacobson & Robertson, 2012); increased electronic 
media access leading to public scrutiny (Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlossberg, & Hernes, 2003),  
sometimes by way of advocacy organizations (Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlossberg, & Hernes, 
2003); and political positioning to secure funding (Jacobson & Robertson, 2012). The intensity of 
these demands appears to require internal focus, and as a result may constrain efforts to 
coherently reach across borders. Another influence that may restrict cross border cooperation 
in resource management is path dependence. Path dependence is the influence of historical 
circumstances on existing organizations and their subsequent behavior. Path dependence can 
limit the ability of organizations to, as David James terms it, “stretch their mandates” (personal 
communication, May 2013).  
 
Transboundary terrestrial resource governance agreements still seem relatively infrequent  
despite an increasing awareness of their potential importance (Jacobson & Robertson, 2012). 
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Beyond their quantity and scope, transboundary resource management agreements are often 
tenuous and/ or ineffective (Tanaka & Matsuoka, 2010; Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
There are a myriad of potential reasons for these limitations, many of which are illustrated in 
the three case studies this thesis explores. Some of the prominent limitations include: 
 Lopsided repercussions of transboundary resource management (van der Linde, 
Oglethorpe, Sandwith, Snelson, & Tessema, 2001). 
 Contradictory management objectives on opposite sides of a boundary (Lurman & 
Rabinowitch, 2007). 
 Concerns over sovereignty (van der Linde, Oglethorpe, Sandwith, Snelson, & 
Tessema, 2001; Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
 Political shifts over time on either or both sides of a border (Norman, 2012). 
 The difficulty of enforcing transboundary agreements especially in an area where 
one entity has no jurisdiction (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
Yet despite these challenges it is important to note that cooperative transboundary resource 
governance is likely to become even more important. The importance of transboundary 
resource governance may be especially relevant in cases of shifting wildlife migration patterns 
and changes in ecoregions (Stephenson, Millar, & Cole, 2010). 
 
As alluded to above, political borders can affect a resource such as a transboundary or 
migratory wildlife population (Forbes & Theberge, 1996). Two clear, non-wolf examples of this 
are anadromous fish such as salmon, and caribou. Both salmon and caribou are important 
human food resources, for calories and for cultural identity in the north. Given the shared 
responsibility for and value of transboundary salmon and caribou, it has been seen as 
advantageous for two governing entities to collaborate their management activities towards 
mutual goals. In the case of salmon and caribou, well established transboundary efforts do exist  
(e.g. Yukon River Panel, Porcupine Caribou Management Board).  
 
Varied management approaches and goals may provide some adaptive capacity (Chapin III, 
Folke, & Kofinas, A Framework for Understanding Change, 2009). Across large, transboundary 
scales, overly cohesive or homogenous strategies and goals, if eventually found harmful could 
6 
endanger aspects of socio-ecological systems on a very large scale (Kofinas, Adaptive Co-
Management in Social-Ecological Governance, 2009; Ostrom, 1990). In simpler terms, mistakes 
on a small scale are small, mistakes on a massive scale are massive.  
 
1.2.2  WHY WOLVES? 
 In many ways, wolves are an ideal transboundary resource for study. Most importantly, they 
are often a transboundary resource, and can be so in many different ways. Wolves occupy large 
areas, regularly move great distances, and can quickly disperse and take up residence in 
previously unoccupied habitat. In some cases, wolves and wolf packs follow migratory ungulates 
across jurisdictional boundaries and through various management regimes (Forbes & Theberge, 
1996; Mech & Boitani, Wolf Social Ecology, 2003). When a wolf pack’s territory is bisected by a 
border, one unit is subject to multiple governing entities (Marrucco & McIntire, 2010).  Young 
members of a pack can disperse up to 1200 kilometers (Provincia Autonoma Di Trento, 2012).  
 
 The habitats with which wolves interact often extend beyond single jurisdictional borders. 
Land and wildlife managers may regulate their portions of transboundary wolf habitats for 
varying purposes. Depending on the context, wolves may or may not benefit from management 
objectives related to forestry, development, or wilderness values, to name a few. Certain 
management regimes can directly and/ or indirectly either further enable or prevent wolf 
migration (Thurber, Peterson, Drummer, & Thomasma, 1994). Management actions that affect 
wolf migration the most include liberal bag limits and outright wolf-control. Impacts of 
management regimes on wolf populations and behavior can further alter the effects wolves 
have on the biological, physical, and sociological (i.e. socio-ecological) attributes of a region. 
  
 Our understanding of the effects wolves have on socio-ecological systems is limited by the 
rarity of controlled experiments and the high number of variables (e.g. population size, effects 
of other predators). Although some academic disagreement exists as to whether wolves are a 
keystone species (Linell, Swenson, & Andersen, 2000; Ucarli, 2011) relatively recent research has 
established that the presence or absence, and abundance of wolves can affect the condition of 
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large natural systems. Some illustrative examples of these large scale effects include findings 
that: 
 Wolves regulate prey numbers (Skogland, 1991).  
 Wolves regulate browsing by prey species through numeric prey reduction and through 
altering prey behavior (i.e. effects beyond simple regulation of prey numbers) (Beschta 
& Ripple, 2013).  
 By preventing ungulate congregations at water sources, and allowing riparian regrowth, 
wolves can improve water quality (e.g. increased shade/ cooler water, decreased 
erosion and sedimentation) (Kaufman, Brodie, & Jules, 2012; Mao, et al., 2005). 
 Maintaining or restoring wolves may maintain or restore biodiversity (Hebblewhite & 
Smith, 2010). 
 A change from absence to presence of wolves or vice versa can lead to sociological 
changes in a region (Fascione & Smith, 2004; Sharpe, Norton, & Donelly, 2001), such as 
difficulty subsisting, a perceived lack of safety, and the inability of some men to prove 
their masculinity by subduing wild nature (Anahita & Mix, 2006). 
 
 The combination of wolves’ transboundary nature and their influence on ecosystems means 
that policies regarding wolves, either within or across boundaries, can have significant 
implications across a range of natural resource management goals. These implications can be 
felt in local, regional and even landscape scale ecosystems, and in associated human values. 
Region-specific and shared examples of social and ecological impacts are addressed in each 
following case study. 
 
 The international, high public profile of wolves further contributes to their suitability as a 
subject of transboundary resource study (Mech & Boitani, Wolves: Behaviour, Ecology, and 
Conservation, 2003; Hayes, 2010). Mass media outlets regularly follow wolf management 
controversies in Alaska and across the United States of America (US), in Switzerland, and Italy 
(e.g. Tagesanzeiger, Zurich; Newsminer, Fairbanks; New York Times, etc.). Opinions regarding 
wolves and wolf management are expressed loudly by interest groups with often opposing goals 
and objectives. Some prominent participants in this public dialogue include  Defenders of 
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Wildlife, Alaska Outdoor Council, Schweizerischer Schafzuchtverband, Gruppe Wolf Schweiz, and 
the International Wolf Center. Many people locally, regionally, nationally and internationally 
seem aware of at least some facets of wolf policy. In part because of the wolf’s media visibility, 
impact on ecosystems and cultural landscapes, and the long cultural history between wolves 
and humans (Lopez, 1978; Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & Boitani, 2003), wolves and wolf-control 
can figure into people’s identities, personally, regionally, and even on national scales (Anahita & 
Mix, 2006; Kaltenborn & Bjerke, 2002; Kellert, Black, Rush, & Bath, 1996). 
  
 The combination of wolf-policy’s biological and cultural implications, lead to economic 
considerations. The economic implications of wolf management are as varied as ecosystem 
services (Schmitz, Hawlena, & Trussel, 2010), ‘non-consumptive’ tourism (Duffield, Neher, & 
Patterson, 2006), economic effects to livestock owners, and sport and subsistence hunting 
opportunities (Kofinas, Subsistence Hunting in a Global Economy: Contributions of Northern 
Wildlife Co-Management to Community Economic Development, 1993; Loveridge, Reynolds, & 
Milner-Gulland, 2006). Presumably for all of these reasons, wolves might be the most studied of 
large, land mammals (Hayes, 2010). 
 
1.2.2.1  WHAT ARE WE MANAGING? 
 The real answer to the question: ‘What are we managing?’ is, of course: ‘people’. Although 
some natural borders are insurmountable for wolves (e.g. the Pacific Ocean), the two regions 
and three case studies I have selected focus on areas where human activity is regulated, 
legislated, or at least informally agreed upon. Human activity in these areas is the decisive factor 
for the status of wolves. As an example, if humans did not legally and illegally remove wolves 
from the population, then recolonization of the entire Alpine Arc by wolves would likely take 
place swiftly. Absent human intervention, recolonization would take place in a wolf-favorable 
context. This present day context consists of alpine forest regrowth, rebounding prey bases, 
reduced human dependence on prey and (local) forest products, and more efficient and 
scientific management of all these resources. Wolf management outcomes do not take place in 
a vacuum. Wolf population outcomes are intertwined with other components of a socio-
ecological system (see Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1: SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: THE GOVERNANCE OF WOLVES IN TRANSBOUNDARY REGIONS 
 
 So ‘What are we managing for?’ Becomes a more apt question than ‘What are We Managing?’ 
The answer is that there are a nearly infinite variety of combinations of wolf management 
outcomes related to social values and ecological factors. I focus here on what parameters are 
used when defining what is meant by ‘wolf management’.   
 
 The socio-ecological framework for the governance of wolves in transboundary regions is an 
essentialized representation. The framework represents the main, shared components I have 
identified in all three case studies that figure into transboundary wolf governance. Generally, 
the components of the socio-ecological framework were divided into two basic categories. The 
first category consists of components defined by natural attributes such as the ecosystem at 
large and wolves. The second category consists of components which are defined intentionally 
by humans such as national and international institutions. I chose the word 'intentional' above, 
recognizing that wolves and the ecosystem have also been defined by humans, though not with 
the explicit intent to do so. Though our definition(s) of wolves and ecosystems attempt to 
describe something existing independent of us, our understanding of  the natural world is limited 
by human perception. This second category also includes formal and informal agreements.  
10 
A third category of socio-ecological framework components that are of combined natural and 
human-derivation was also necessary. In this third category, components such as 'region' are 
both defined by the natural world (e.g. geography) and humans (e.g. cultural delineation). 
Boundaries and local and non-local stakeholders also belong to this third category. Boundaries 
can be both natural (e.g. river, mountains) and/ or human-designated, political borders. Local 
and non-local stakeholders, likewise, are defined by their proximity and through cultural 
identification. 
 
 Components primarily categorized as ‘natural’ are shaded green. Components primarily 
categorized as ‘human-derived’ are shaded blue. Components that are a combination of 
‘natural’ and ‘human derived’ have a gradient fill.  
 
Components such as (political) boundaries, national institutions (e.g. national wolf 
management plans), international institutions (e.g. Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats [Bern Convention]), and intranational institutions (e.g. memoranda 
of understanding between the National Park Service [NPS] and the state of Alaska) have rigidly 
defined physical or figurative boundaries. These rigidly defined components are represented by 
rectangles.  
 
Components with less easily defined physical or figurative boundaries such as non-local 
stakeholders (What is a stakeholder? And, to a lesser extent, what is local?), or wolves (We 
know what wolves are, but their territories, behaviors, and locations are less predictable.) are 
represented with ovals. Again, there was a need for a third, in-between category; in this case 
where figurative or physical boundaries are more or less defined, but open to interpretation. An 
example of an in-between component is 'region'. There might be a general consensus about the 
existence of a region (e.g. the Alpine Arc, ecoregions, French-speaking Switzerland); however, 
the borders of regions are often nebulous with some cultural or physical attributes defying 
simple delineation. This third type of component is represented by rectangles with rounded 
corners.  
 
11 
 
 The placement of shapes within the framework is representative of physical or figurative 
overlap or lack thereof. For example: non-local stakeholders are completely within the 
ecosystem, there is also minor overlap between non-local stakeholders and local stakeholders 
because of the indistinctness of 'local' (physically and culturally). More significant overlap can be 
seen between ‘local stakeholders’ and 'region' indicating that for the most part, stakeholders 
who consider themselves and/ or are considered ‘local’ are local to a region.  
 
 Finally, a division exists between: the physical world of ecosystems, wolves, regions, and 
stakeholders; and institutions created to aid in the governance of the aforementioned. This 
latter category of acknowledged institutions is displayed within a rectangle with rounded 
corners. These institutions are sometimes interpreted, reinterpreted, and changed. This shape 
has a perforated boundary because it is not a component in itself, rather a grouping. An 
‘institutions’ component would inevitably include aspects of ‘region’, ‘local stakeholders’, and 
‘non-local stakeholders’; however, this framework is intended to highlight only the main 
components of the system and their interplay. Apropos of interplay, lines and arrows simply 
show the main direction of influence between components. Large, gradient arrows signify that 
despite dominant directions of influence, all components from all categories inherently 
influence each other.  
 
  ‘What is a wolf?’ Seems like a simple enough question, but wolf – dog hybridization and 
contested definitions of sub-species complicate our vernacular understanding of what a wolf is. 
To further complicate the situation, as we shall see, wolves are often managed by pack units, or 
even by individual wolves’ statuses in a pack. 
 
1.2.2.1.1  ALASKA 
 In the contiguous states, questions of species, sub-species, populations and danger of 
extinction lead to complicated legal situations. One such situation is related to Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) protection (O'Brien & Mayr, 1991). In Alaska, attempts have been and will 
likely be made again to use the ESA to protect small, isolated populations such as the Alexander 
Archipelago grey wolf population (proposed subspecies), and or their habitat (Wolf & Edwards, 
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2011). Current wolf habitat surrounding the locations of my case studies remains traversable by 
wolves, and largely unfragmented. Thanks to these habitat characteristics, genetic questions are 
ostensibly irrelevant in both Alaska case studies. The National Park Service (NPS) does have clear 
policy on genetic resource management principles (United States National Park Service, 2006), 
though it is unlikely to come into play due to the connectivity of Alaska’s landscape. Population 
questions, on the other hand, play important roles in both Alaska cases. This is especially so at 
the pack unit level. The NPS’ Population Management Principles in particular are relevant in 
Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.2.1.2  WESTERN ALPS: ITALY & SWITZERLAND 
 In the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and 
Natural Habitats (Bern Convention) (Council of Europe, 1979), discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, parties of the treaty have committed to not removing wolves for virtually any reason 
if removal jeopardizes the population. In the early stages of my research I was in contact with 
Walter Vetterli at World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Switzerland (personal communication, December 
2009). I questioned how Switzerland, a party to the Bern Convention, could officially permit the 
removal of any wolves, as had recently been done, and not endanger a ‘population’ of between 
1 and 8 individuals. Christian Kilchofer, a lawyer for the Swiss government, offered a legal 
justification. Kilchofer stated that the term ‘population’ as it is used by the Bern Convention 
refers to a ‘biological population’ (personal communication, December, 2009). According to 
Kilchofer (at that time), there was considered to be no isolated Swiss populations. 
The population of wolves at that time consisted of young dispersing males originating from Italy, 
in Switzerland as part of a regular transboundary “come and go” of species (personal 
communication, December, 2009). The fact that two years prior to my communication with 
Kilchofer, Switzerland, Italy, and France had entered into an agreement recognizing a single 
Italian-Swiss-French wolf population (Consentino, Michele, & Oberle, 2006) highlights the 
complexity of understandings regarding what ‘population’ is in question. 
 
 This raises a number of questions such as: If these dispersers do not belong to a Swiss 
population, what population do those wolves belong to? Do they belong to a ‘population’ at all? 
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If they originated in Italy, is it a portion of the Italian wolf population that is being managed, a 
portion of the Italian-Swiss-French population, or are the wolves in question a part of a larger 
European population? Is preventing dispersing wolves from a long isolated, potentially 
genetically depressed, Italian population from reaching packs and dispersers from Slovenian and 
other eastern European populations, as suggested by Angelo Gandolfi and others (personal 
communication, April 2010), jeopardizing a population? If so, which population(s) is this 
immigration prevention harming? On the other hand, the Italian wolf might represent its own 
subspecies (Lucchini, Galov, & Randi, 2004). Would allowing populations to mix dilute or cause a 
subspecies to go extinct? Does it matter? To add a further layer of complexity, what if the 
dispersing male is a wolf-dog hybrid? Is it even a wolf? What is the threshold for a wolf to be a 
wolf?   
 
 A number of the above questions have been clearly and pragmatically answered in the 
Guidelines for Population Level Management Plans for Large Carnivores (Guidelines) penned by 
the Large Carnivore Initiative for Europe (LCIE) in 2008 at the request of the European Union 
(EU) (Linnell, Salvatori, & Boitani, 2008). The Guidelines provide best practices, and are not 
legally binding. The Guidelines do, however, clarify some ambiguities within overarching, 
relevant treaties such as the Bern Convention (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The Guidelines 
were also created specifically with the intent to apply to EU, as well as non-EU countries such as 
Switzerland. Switzerland has adopted the Guidelines (C. Nienhuis, personal communication, 
April, 1013). The relevant institutional levels affecting wolves in all case studies are explored in 
Chapter 3.  
 
 The Guidelines addresses the standard definition of ‘population’  as: “a group of individuals 
(of the same species), living in the same area and potentially reproducing among each other,” 
and juxtaposes it with the “reality” of spatial heterogeneity, discontinuity and fragmentation. 
Instead of ‘population’ the Guidelines proposes using ‘metapopulation’, a “series of small(er) 
(sub-) populations with a limited exchange of individuals.” In the Guidelines, isolated 
occurrences, populations and subpopulations, parts of populations and management units, all fit 
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within a ‘metapopulation’. A stated goal of the Guidelines is to shift the management focus from 
the species and management unit, to this (meta-) population.  
 
 In December of 2009, wolves were legally removed in Switzerland because they were not 
considered part of a ‘population’. These same wolves are clearly part of a  ‘metapopulation’. 
Other legally defensible reasons for removing wolves from a population, even under Bern 
Convention protection are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 The question of dog - wolf hybridization is also addressed as a potential problem by the 
Guidelines. The Guidelines states that it is likely impossible to ensure that wolf populations are 
completely free of dog genes. It also states that natural breeding selection will likely remove 
these genes from the population. The Guidelines recommended certain actions, such as 
minimizing wolf-dog hybrid pets, and removing obvious hybrids from the wild, in such a way 
that they are afforded the same protection of wolves but can be effectively removed by trained 
government employees.  
 
Perhaps a more subtle or even unintended implication resides in the mention that 
hybridization most often occurs in places with very low wolf densities, and in areas where 
wolves are subject to heavy perturbation. I believe one can read this as a suggestion that the 
best way to minimize hybridization is to have a large enough wolf population that wolves’ 
preference for breeding with wolves, not dogs, is realizable.  
 
1.2.3  REGIONS OF CHOICE FOR CASE STUDIES 
 Alaska and the Western Alps have starkly different histories with relation to wolf populations 
and human density. Nonetheless, there are several similarities between the transboundary 
governance issues of wolves in both regions.  
 
 To begin with wolf - human issues, American/ Alaskan populations of European descent 
inherited, to some degree immigration-era, contemporary European perspective on wolves. 
These historic, primarily negative, European cultural perceptions of wolves are evident in past  
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actions toward wolves in both regions (Lopez, 1978). The evolution of strongly dichotomous 
attitudes towards wolves has followed a similar trajectory on both sides of the Atlantic albeit 
with different time-frames.  
 
 Both Alaska and the Alps are culturally iconic for their relative wildness and nature-oriented 
attributes (Kollin, 2000; Zimmer, 1998). In present popular culture, wolves are often seen as an 
embodiment of wildness (Lopez, 1978; Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & Boitani, 2003). In both the 
Western Alps and Alaska friction is apparent between local, rural populations and urban 
advocacy for wolves. Rural populations tend to favor actively controlling or eliminating wolf 
populations. Urban populations tend towards a more protectionist orientation toward wolves. 
Rural populations feel more immediately affected by wolves and wolf management. Urban 
populations are larger than rural populations and have an advantage at higher-level politics and 
well-funded advocacy (e.g. national, international). Some friction occurs as some locals resist  
what they see as urban environmentalists’ imposition of urban, wolf-related values on locals. 
These ‘urban environmentalists’ are perceived by locals as not having to live with the effects of 
their own pro-wolf advocacy (Boertje, Keeck, & Paragi, 2010; Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & 
Boitani, 2003). The rural - urban strife goes much deeper than a superficial recounting (Robbins, 
2004).  
 
 Some of the main rhetorical tropes in favor of wolf-control in Alaska, and against wolf 
recolonization in the Western Alps are also interestingly similar. Uncontrolled and/ or 
recolonizing wolf populations are seen by some as posing a threat to livelihood, food security, 
traditional activities, and human safety (Anahita & Mix, 2006; Schweizerischer 
Schafzuchtsverband, n/d). 
  
 Borders also figure prominently into the debate(s) about wolves. In Alaska, the State’s 
policies of aerial wolf-control, a component of intensive management (IM) meant to increase 
ungulate numbers for human harvest, are particularly controversial and salient. The controversy 
and saliency is evident in both the state itself, and the nation at large (Boertje, Keeck, & Paragi, 
2010; National Research Council, 1997). In contrast to the State’s IM program, the NPS is well-
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known for its nature-preservation and visitor-experience orientation. Specific mandates and 
policies of the NPS and NPS’ research goals and functions are less well known than NPS’ visitor 
experience and preservation activities, but are at least as important in wolf-policy discourse. 
Conflicting NPS and State mandates clash at shared jurisdictional borders. The resulting mutually 
consequential transboundary agreements and fallouts between the State and the NPS have 
been well publicized (e.g. nationally in the New York Times, and locally in the Fairbanks Daily 
Newsminer).  
  
 In the Trinational Alp region, a small remnant population of wolves (estimated at less than 
100 individuals) from Italy has begun to increase in number and recolonize their former range in 
Switzerland and France (Breitenmoser, 1998). Wolf recolonization triggered multi-level 
governance agreements regarding wildlife protection that had been created decades before, 
such as the 1979 Bern Convention. How well Italian, Swiss, and French signers of applicable 
international treaties foresaw the present recolonization can only be speculated upon.  
 
 The most vocal opponents of recolonization are rural,  border region, locals (Institute of 
Sociology, University of Bern, 1999). As mentioned before, some members of this constituency 
even express a desire to re-extirpate the wolf altogether. At the other end of the spectrum, a 
similarly vocal ‘environmentalist’ constituency strongly favors recolonization. Though the 
majority of the public may be considered ambivalent (U. Breitenmoser, personal 
communication, May 2013), they support the return of the wolf when polled (Boutros, 2003).  
 
 It is also important to note that although one of the main agreements studied in this thesis is 
a trinational agreement between Italy, Switzerland, and France, I focused on the Italian - Swiss 
border. Unlike Switzerland, Italy and France are both members of the EU and are both bound by 
the Habitats' Directive 92/43/EEC (Habitats Directive) (European Union, 1992), discussed in 
Chapter 3. The Habitats Directive is more explicit and enforceable than overarching agreements 
affecting all three countries. This results in a larger contrast across the EU - Swiss border, than 
across the Italian – French border. Sufficient differences exist between Italian and French wolf 
management to preclude handling them as one entity, but handling all three became much 
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more muddled and much less manageable. Interviews and other personal communications 
confirm that Italian and French approaches to wolf management are more cohesive with each 
other, than either EU countries’ approach is with the Swiss approach (C. Neinhuis, April, 2013; E. 
Dupré, April, 2013). As a result I believe that studying management across the Italian - Swiss 
border provides more insight.  
 
1.2.4   METHODOLOGY 
 
1.2.4.1  CASE STUDY 
 In order to develop a better understanding of transboundary wolf governance agreements I 
chose a case study approach. Using case study as a method is a fitting tool when ‘how’ questions 
need to be answered and the research focuses on contemporary topics (Yin, 1989). Case Studies 
are furthermore appropriate when researchers do not require control over research subjects’ 
behavior, or events (Yin, 1989). All of the above indicate the appropriateness of case study 
method for this research.  
 
1.2.4.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In all three cases, I undertook a review of academic and gray literature, as well as newspaper 
articles, related organizations’ websites and other relevant sources. This information served as a 
foundation for all three cases. Thorough knowledge of available information provided me a level 
of credibility with interviewees. The knowledge also enabled me to participate in deeper, more 
informed communications during elite interviews than would have otherwise been possible.   
 
1.2.4.3  ELITE INTERVIEWS & PROLONGED E-DIALOGUES 
 Between December 2009 and May 2013, I conducted elite interviews with 26 subjects. 
Interviews ranged in length from a couple of minutes to over an hour. Additionally, due to 
scheduling complexities and the intercontinental scope of this study, I engaged in several 
prolonged e-mail dialogues. Many of these communications began as brief telephone calls or e-
mails for clarification of publicly available material and morphed into something more 
encompassing. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to all contacts as interviewees. Interviewees were 
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chosen because of their position to speak officially on a subject or for an organization, their 
direct involvement in a case study, and/ or their extensive knowledge of one or more case 
studied; i.e., “to acquire information and context that only that person can provide about some 
event or process” (Lamont & White, 2005).  
 
 When an interview was likely to be longer than a few minutes, I contacted the interviewees 
in advance to make an appointment for a telephone or face-to-face discussion. Some 
interviewees were contacted multiple times over the course of the study as new information 
came to light or became necessary. Follow-up e-mails were sent shortly after all 
communications thanking participants and. Where appropriate, these e-mails included brief 
summaries of information collected, for confirmation of accuracy.   
 
 In all three case studies, I used snowball sampling. That is, initial interviewees referred me to 
other relevant interviewees. This method was particularly important since I was trying to 
determine where the knowledge was located (Noy, 2007).   
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUNDS 
 
 To more fully understand the institutions, agreements, and impacts explored in Chapter 3, 
certain background information is needed. First in section 2.1, I provide a general overview of 
the case studies’ regions’ geographies. Following this high-level geography, I zoom in to the 
attributes of the borders in question.  This is followed by a brief comparison of the regions and 
borders. 
 
 Section 2.2 provides the environmental and social historical context in which each case 
exist(ed). Special attention is given to the vitriolic wolf controversy in Alaska. Again, points of 
comparison between the two regions are discussed. 
 
 Finally in section 2.3, I integrate both regions in a discussion of overall trends in changing 
attitudes towards wolves and nature.  
 
2.1 GEOGRAPHY & BOUNDARIES 
 
2.1.1  ALASKA 
 Alaska extends 3,639 km east to west at its widest, and 2,285 km north to south, for a total 
of 1,477,953 km2 (United States Census Bureau, 2013) between the latitudes of 51°20'N to 
71°50'N, and the longitudes of 130°W to 172°E. Alaska shares a long artificial, geometric border 
on the east with Yukon, Canada. The geometric border in the southeast panhandle area 
separating Alaska from British Columbia (see Figure 2.1) is based loosely on geologic features 
and has been subject to debate since Russian times (Penlington, 1972).  
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FIGURE 2.1: REGIONS OF ALASKA MAP 
 
The state is surrounded mostly by water. The distance between the Alaskan mainland to Russian 
mainland is about 82 kilometers. 
 
 There are various ways to break Alaska down by region. For reference and simplicity’s sake I 
refer to the Regions of Alaska used by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG), seen in 
Figure 2.1. Both Alaska case studies are located mostly in the Interior Region. In the second case, 
Denali National Park and Preserve (Denali) extends into the Southcentral Region.  
 
ADFG further breaks Regions down into self-descriptive, Game Management Units (GMUs). 
GMU boundaries follow natural geographical boundaries, and cover the entire state for the 
purpose of State game management. An example of GMUs can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
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FIGURE 2.2: ALASKA CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW MAP 
 
 Both of the Alaska case studies focus on areas within the overarching ‘boreal’ ecoregion. 
 
 The road system is sparse in Alaska (see Figure 2.2), leaving vast areas of the state primarily 
accessible only by boat, plane, and snow machine.  
 
 The population of Alaska was estimated at 710,231 in 2010 (United States Census Bureau, 
2010). Numerous cities and villages in Alaska are located on and off the road system, but only a 
handful have populations in the thousands. Main population centers in Alaska are Anchorage 
(pop. 291,826), Fairbanks (pop. 31,535), and the State Capital Juneau (pop. 31,275) (United 
States Census Bureau, 2010). The low population density and limited infrastructure footprint 
have left largely intact, unfragmented natural areas.  
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 Wolves occur throughout mainland Alaska and on many Islands. In Alaska wolves are found 
in most of their historic range with the exception of urban areas, though even in Anchorage and 
Fairbanks wolves occur on the outskirts of town. Wolves have never been categorized as 
threatened or endangered in the State, though they were once extirpated from the Kenai 
Peninsula in 1915. Wolves recolonized the Kenai Peninsula in the 1960s (Peterson & Wollington, 
1982). 
 
2.1.2   WESTERN ALPS: ITALY & SWITZERLAND 
 The peninsula of Italy is located between the latitudes of 35°N and 48°N. The country is 
301,263 km² and has a population of around 60,000,000 (European Union, 2013). Italian 
territory includes the following ecoregions (WWF, n/d): 
 European-Mediterranean Montane Mixed Forests. 
 Mediterranean Forests, Woodlands and Scrub. 
 Mediterranean Sea ecoregions. 
 
 Landlocked Switzerland, is located between 45°49’N and 47°48'N. The country is 41,285 km2 
and has a population of 7,954,662 (European Commission, 2013). Swiss territory includes the 
following ecoregions (WWF, n/d): 
 Western European Broadleaf Forest. 
 Alps Conifer and Mixed Forest ecoregions. 
 
 Human population centers and their infrastructural trappings generally exist in the less 
mountainous regions of Italy and Switzerland. Despite the adaptability of wolves, they are 
infrequent in urban areas (KORA, 2013; Boitani, Ciucci, & Raganella-Pelliccioni, 2010) and seem 
unlikely to establish a foothold there. The mountainous region, focused on in this case study is 
sometimes known as the Alpine Arc. The Alpine Arc stretches from the southeast of France, up 
across the north of Italy, through most of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and into Austria, southern 
Germany, and Slovenia (Figure 2.3). 
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FIGURE 2.3: ALPINE ARC MAP 
 
Due to the location of the Italian - Swiss border, I will use the term Western Alps in my third 
case study. 'Western Alps' is also a term associated with a larger, traditional sub-categorization 
of the European Alps. The term Western Alpine Arc would likely be a better choice were I to 
address the entire trajectory of wolf recolonization. The Western Alpine Arc includes the Italian 
Apennines. The Apennines run the length of the Italian peninsula and were the refugium for the 
relict population of Italian wolves before their population re-expansion.  
 
 Wolves, once present across most of Europe, were extirpated on a large scale. Remnant wolf 
populations persisted in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and many of the Balkan States (Breitenmoser, 
1998). In the last 30 years, wolves have begun recolonizing neighboring countries 
(Breitenmoser, 1998). 
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 Political borders between Italy and Switzerland follow both natural and cultural borders. The 
road and infrastructure system in Italy and Switzerland is extensive (see Figure 2.4), and ‘cultural 
landscapes’ even exist in extremely rugged terrain. Habitat is highly fragmented. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4: WESTERN ALPS: ITALY, SWITZERLAND, & FRANCE MAP1 
  
2.1.3  COMPARISON 
Alaska and the Western Alps have dissimilar climates and latitudes; however, both regions 
have suitable wolf habitat. Main points of geographical contrast between the Alaskan and 
Western Alps case study regions are population density, infrastructure density, and associated 
habitat fragmentation. The scale of Alaska is large in comparison with Italy and Switzerland, yet 
the scale of the relevant borders is similar (see Figures 2.2 and 2.4).  
                                                             
1 See discussion of study area in Chapter 1 
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 Jurisdictional boundaries are quite different between the two regions, but the natural 
borders in all case studies are permeable for wolves. Though wolves do not respect jurisdictional 
boundaries, some evidence suggests that they may learn to avoid them if they perceive danger 
(Thurber, Peterson, Drummer, & Thomasma, 1994). If the boundaries in question intrinsically 
prevented or significantly reduced transboundary wolf movement, no impetus for creating the 
agreements examined in this thesis would have existed. 
 
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL HISTORY IN CONTEXT 
 
2.2.1  ALASKA 
There is little information about wolf-human interactions in the Alaska region before 
European contact and settlement.  Alaska is a big place with many, very different cultural 
groups. Recognized, somewhat permeable natural and cultural borders in the Alaska-region 
extend well beyond the present-day, artificial, geometrical Alaska-Canada border. These cultural 
regions are defined largely by language group and corresponding cultural practices (Figure 2.5). 
For these reasons it is impossible to make definitive statements about historical Native Alaskan 
wolf-human interactions.  
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FIGURE 2.5: ALASKA NATIVE LANGUAGES MAP 
 
 It seems pre- and post-contact hunting and trapping of wolves as furbearers for use and 
trade was common. From what is known historical, cultural animosity between Alaska Natives 
and wolves does not appear to have been common (Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & Boitani, 2003). 
Likewise, no evidence exists pointing to, concentrated attempts by Alaska Native to control wolf 
populations historically (Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & Boitani, 2003).There are some stories from 
pre-contact times about wolf denning (i.e. killing wolf pups in their dens) (Fritts, Stephenson, 
Hayes, & Boitani, 2003). Denning was apparently most frequent when prey species abundance 
was low, but efforts to control wolf numbers do not appear to have been widespread (Lopez, 
1978). Limited pre-contact wolf-control can likely be attributed to one or more of the following: 
a lack of means to significantly reduce wolf numbers (e.g. guns), a lack of biological need to 
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reduce wolf numbers (i.e. there was sufficient prey), or a lack cultural disposition to control 
wolves.  
 
 Some oral history stories refer to multi-generational, pre-contact, periods of limited game 
abundance (National Research Council, 1997; Fritts, Stephenson, Hayes, & Boitani, 2003). 
Present day wolf-control proponents and others sometimes point to these periods of limited 
game abundance as evidence for the predator pit hypothesis. The following is a simplified 
version of the hypothesis as described by Mech and Peterson (Mech & Peterson, Wolf Prey 
Relations, 2003).  
 
 The hypothesis is based on the idea that there are three basic, potential equilibria between 
predators and prey. The first equilibrium is: ‘high-high’. In this equilibrium there is a stable 
abundance of both predators and prey until a stochastic event (e.g. pandemic illness; recurring, 
abnormally severe winters) disturbs the system and throws it into one of the other two states.  
 
 The second equilibrium is ‘dynamic’, with correlated peaks and crashes in both predator and 
prey numbers. In this state for example, there may be abundant moose, and few wolves. These 
wolves would prey heavily on moose, increasing in numbers until there are so many wolves that 
there is insufficient moose. Next, the wolf population would then crash; allowing the moose 
population to recover, and so forth.  
 
 The third equilibrium is ‘low-low’, where predation keeps prey numbers much lower than the 
habitat’s carrying capacity for prey species. In this state low prey numbers keep predator 
numbers from increasing, and predation keeps prey numbers low. This third theoretical state is 
also known as the ‘predator pit’. A stochastic event to a predator – prey system in this state 
could lead to the extirpation or extinction of the species. Some scientists have suggested that 
removing a large percentage of predators from this low-low equilibrium for long enough will 
allow prey populations to recover to a high density. Once prey numbers have recovered 
sufficiently, predators can then be allowed to recover. The theoretical result of this 
management intervention is the creation of a stable, ‘high-high’ equilibrium.  
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 Although there is virtually no debate that wolves (and other predators) have an impact on 
prey numbers (Hayes, 2010; National Research Council, 1997), the validity of the multiple 
equilibriums and predator pit hypotheses is subject to debate. Real world experiences have 
shown the concept is at best over-simplified (Mech & Peterson, Wolf Prey Relations, 2003). 
Tying this hypothesis into a poorly understood and incomplete (pre)historical context is 
inconclusive. 
 
 When the first permanently settling Europeans, came to Alaska in 1740, about 80,000 
indigenous people lived in Alaska (Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 
2013). The Europeans, mostly Russians, remained close to the coast hunting furs and interacting 
with the indigenous population. Europeans imported European pathogens, Christianity (Alaska 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2013), and a (sometimes related to 
Christianity) anti-wolf disposition (Lopez, 1978).  
 
 The United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. A series of gold rushes caused 
pockets of population growth in the, then, territory (Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce 
Development, 2013). Concentrated populations, cut forests for fuel and timber, and hunted 
prey intensely (National Research Council, 1997). These activities lead to historically low game 
populations and in 1915 precipitated a wolf bounty (National Research Council, 1997).  
 
 Alaska followed a similar wolf-control trajectory to the contiguous US. Wolf-control was 
carried out through poisoning and trapping. When airplanes became available, aerial shooting 
by federal agents was the norm (National Research Council, 1997). Lopez and others have 
suggested that this aggressive effort to eradicate wolves was only partially related to bolstering 
game availability (Lopez, 1978). He argues eradication efforts upheld the vehement status quo 
of perceiving wolves as an enemy and a pest with little or no positive traits (Lopez, 1978). Lopez 
further argues that this attitude, originally imported with European immigrants, was amplified in 
the Americas (Lopez, 1978). 
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  During World War II, military bases were built  in Anchorage and Fairbanks, leading to a 
large human population influx (Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2013). 
The militarily strategic Alaska Highway built in 1942, connected Fairbanks to the lower 48 states. 
Such road access facilitated human population increase, and made some areas more accessible 
than they had been for hunting. In the late 1950s, airplanes had become accessible enough that 
people besides federal agents began engaging in aerial wolf-control (National Research Council, 
1997). By the 1960’s aerial hunting by the public was common  (Regelin, 2002). Alaska became a 
State in 1959.  
 
 In 1963, the ADFG classified wolves as a big game animal and a fur bearer, assigning value to 
the wolf, and putting some regulations on wolf hunting (Regelin, 2002). In 1968 the wolf bounty 
was lifted (Habro & Dean, 1981).  
 
 The discovery of oil in 1968 led to: a) an economic and human population boom (Alaska 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2013); b) the need for the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) (1971), which led to the official designation of Federal, State, 
Native and private land ownership, and later the Alaska National Interest Land Claims Act 
(ANILCA) (1980), discussed in more detail in Chapter 3; c) the construction of the Dalton 
Highway, eventually making more, previously remote landscape accessible; and d) continued 
urban growth, especially in Fairbanks. Undoubtedly many of these newcomers subscribed on 
some level to retro-frontier masculinity. Many immigrants to Alaska had a romantic image of 
untouched wilderness, and a desire to embody their masculine ideals in (Anahita & Mix, 2006). 
Though hunting for many of these newcomers was not a caloric necessity, it increased the strain 
on prey species such as moose and caribou. The human population in 1990 reached 550,043 
(Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2013). 
 
 The human population in Alaska continues to grow (Alaska Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development, 2013). The number of hunting permits issued is also growing (Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, 2013), but at a slower rate than human population growth in 
Alaska. At the same time the percentage of Alaskans engaged in hunting is declining (U.S. 
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Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. Department of Commerce,, 
2013). Additionally, a clear rural to urban migration is taking place (Alaska Department of Labor 
and Workforce Development, 2013). If these trends continue, wolf-control conflict is likely to 
increase. Growing hunting pressure on limited prey will likely increase the demand among 
hunters for wolf-control. At the same time a growing urban, wildlife protectionist-oriented, base 
will likely increase political pressure against wolf-control. These changes will challenge path 
dependent, Alaska wildlife management institutions’ status quo.  
 
2.2.1.1  THE WOLF-CONTROL CONTROVERSY IN ALASKA 
 Because of the high-level of controversy surrounding Alaska wolf-control policies, additional 
context is useful for understanding the forthcoming cases.  
 
 Hunting constitutes an important component of, especially rural and Native, Alaskan identity. 
This appears prominently in both ANILCA and the Alaska State Constitution. Figure 2.6 shows 
active IM areas in Alaska, and generalized proximity of current predator control efforts2.  
                                                             
2 Source: ADF&G (2013) Intensive Management in Alaska. Retrieved from: 
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=intensivemanagement.programs. Note: Actual predator 
control units are usually smaller subsets of the subunits highlighted on this map.  
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FIGURE 2.6: ACTIVE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT IN ALASKA MAP 
 
 Predator control efforts generally focus on areas near roads, rivers, and population centers. 
Access simplifies hunting for and transporting large moose and caribou. This question of access 
highlights the importance of infrastructure.   
 
 Traditional perceptions and scientific studies indict wolves as a major limiting factor in 
ungulate population numbers (National Research Council, 1997).  Bears, habitat carrying 
capacity, and human activities (e.g. hunting, infrastructure) similarly contribute to limiting 
ungulate population numbers (Schneider, Hauer, Adamowicz, & Boutin, 2010; National Research 
Council, 1997).  
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 Bears are sometimes at the receiving end of predator control efforts, but bear-control is less 
common than wolf-control. One reason for this is that bears seem to invoke more cultural 
empathy than wolves in mainstream western society (Dingwall, 2001; Kellert, Black, Rush, & 
Bath, 1996). A second reason relates to major biological (especially reproductive) differences 
between wolves and bears (National Research Council, 1997).  Bears reproduce much more 
slowly than wolves. Because of slow reproduction, it takes longer for bear populations to recover 
from predator control than wolf populations. Because wolves reproduce quickly, they can fill 
niches left by reduced bear populations, especially if wolves are not aggressively controlled at 
the same time. This can lead to fewer bears over a long time -horizon, but little overall reduction 
in predation. If primarily wolves are controlled, they can bounce back quickly if management 
desires. Also, when wolf population numbers are reduced, wolves’ niche is unlikely to be filled by 
bears (in the short term) because of bears’ slower reproduction rate.  
 
 Wolf-control cannot sustainably increase ungulate numbers if sufficient ungulate habitat (e.g. 
forage) does not exist (National Research Council, 1997). As mentioned above, opponents of 
wolf-control frequently suggest that proposed control areas lack sufficient ungulate carrying 
capacity (Van Ballenberghe, 2004; Medred, 2013). Proponents of wolf-control such as David 
James, ADFG Regional Supervisor, counter that nutritional analyses of ungulates are used to 
ensure ungulates have sufficient forage (personal communication, May 2013). Nutritional 
analysis in the context of management is discussed more thoroughly in 3.2.2.7. Lag time in 
manifestations of nutritional measures, and other factors further complicate the conversation 
(National Research Council, 1997).  
 
 The Alaska State Constitution mandates resources management “for the maximum benefit of 
[the] people" (Alaska Const. Art. VIII, §2). ‘Maximum benefit of the people’ lends itself to 
consumptive (e.g. hunting) leaning, and ‘non-consumptive’ (e.g. wildlife viewing) leaning 
interpretations. State law puts wildlife regulation in the hands of the BOG. The ADFG is 
responsible for Wildlife management responsibilities. The State Intensive Management Law (AS 
16.05.255 (e)), further requires the BOG to adopt IM (e.g. predator control, habitat 
enhancement) before reducing human harvest. Alaska uses wolf-control as a method of fulfilling 
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legal obligations and social pressure for hunting opportunities. Institutions, stipulations and 
exceptions are more thoroughly discussed in context in Chapter 3. 
 
 Studies indicate the need for a large percentage of wolves (60-100%) to be removed from an 
area for years, to effectively boost ungulate (e.g. moose, caribou) numbers (Mech & Peterson, 
Wolf Prey Relations, 2003). Ungulate population and harvest objectives set at high levels, may 
require perpetual wolf-control (Hayes, 2010).  
 
 Lethal and non-lethal forms of wolf-control exist. Non-lethal wolf-control methods such as 
sterilization, diversionary feeding, and relocation of animals are somewhat less controversial 
than lethal methods (National Research Council, 1997). But these methods are generally 
considered too costly and too difficult to be effective (Regelin, 2002; Mech & Peterson, Wolf 
Prey Relations, 2003).  
 
 Aerial wolf-control is seen by managers as the most efficient and effective way to reduce wolf 
numbers sufficiently (National Research Council, 1997; Hayes, 2010). In the absence of a bounty, 
trapping and hunting removes insufficient numbers of wolves to meet management objectives. 
Even open bag limits and perpetual seasons appear insufficient (Hayes, 2010).  In Alaska, wolf 
bounties were banned in 1984 (Sec. 29 Ch 132 SLA 1984), and have only seriously been revisited 
once. In 2007, a short-lived ‘incentive program’ was created to compensate public participants in 
aerial wolf hunts for the high cost of aviation fuel, in light of low pelt prices (D'Oro, 2007). The 
program was stopped by a judge within 10 days, and no payouts were made (D'Oro, 2007).  
 
 Poisoning was economic and effective (Hayes, 2010), but was banned after statehood 
(Regelin, 2002). Concern for negative externalities on other wildlife and the environment  
brought about the ban on poisoning as a wolf-control method (National Research Council, 1997). 
Concentrated ground efforts using snow machines to hunt wolves have also been attempted to 
mixed results (National Research Council, 1997). 
 
 Although all current means of wolf-control are to some extent controversial in Alaska, 
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aircraft related means appear most controversial. Simply the idea of shooting wolves from 
aircrafts strikes many as inherently cruel and unfair.  
  
 There are three types of wolf-control associated with aircraft:  
 Aerial gunning, from a fixed-wing airplane or helicopter. 
 Land and shoot. Wolves can be tracked from the air, but the plane must land before a 
wolf can be shot.  
 Same day airborne, is the same as land and shoot, but the shooter must be at least 300 
feet from the plane.  
  
 There were several arguments that appeared recurrently in my research. One argument 
against aerial wolf-control was that permitting the public to participate in land-and-shoot wolf-
control is a defiance of the will of the majority of the Alaska public.  
 
 Congress passed the Federal Airborne Hunting Act (Pub.L. 92-159, § 1, 85 Stat. 480) in 1972. 
The law was a response to increased nation-wide awareness and negative response to Alaska’s 
wolf-control program. The Federal Airborne Hunting Act banned aerial hunting except in cases 
of ‘biological emergency’ (i.e. to avoid the irreversible loss of a prey population).  ‘Biological 
emergency’ is the loophole that the State of Alaska uses to circumvent Airborne Hunting Act 
prohibitions on shooting wolves from airplanes. The state interprets ‘biological emergency’ 
liberally, even issuing permits to the public to participate in land-and-shoot wolf-control (Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, 2013).  
 
 Among wolf-control opponents there appears to be a preference for officials rather than the 
public to do the shooting, if a biological emergency exists. In 1996, the Alaskan public passed a 
citizens’ initiative (Alaska Prohibit Airborne Hunting [Measure 3]) banning the practice of 
allowing the public to participate in aerial wolf-control. Through ‘legislative tampering’ the State 
Legislature overturned the initiative in 2000 (SB 267, 2000). A further voter “Veto Referendum” 
passed in November of the same year (Alaska Land-And-Shoot Referendum [Measure 6]) which 
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had the effect of vetoing SC 267. This vote was overturned by the legislature in 2003 (SB 155, 
2003). Subsequent citizens’ initiatives have been unsuccessful.  
 
 Several interviewees also expressed sentiments of disenfranchisement due to BOG makeup. 
The current administration appoints BOG members. BOG appointees almost always have a 
vested interest in hunting and trapping. It has been argued that this makeup fails to represent  a 
cross-section of Alaska wildlife values; such as those of the approximately 80% of non-hunting 
Alaskans3.  
 
 Economic arguments put forth against wolf-control include its high costs. These costs are 
sometimes contrasted with the high value of non-consumptive wildlife uses (e.g. photography, 
wildlife viewing, tourism). Factoring out cultural values in hunting, it has also been argued that 
simply providing other sources of protein (especially to remote, subsistence hunters) would be 
less expensive than boosting prey numbers through predator control.  
 
 Despite the elusiveness of exact price tags, the consensus is that wolf-control is expensive. 
Present wolf-control efforts are costly enough that ADFG is at the ceiling of available (and likely 
forthcoming) funding for these efforts (D. James, personal communication, May 2013).  
 
   Some opponents of wolf-control romantically view wolves as the embodiment of 
wilderness itself, and echo writings of Jack London and Aldo Leopold. Wolf-control opponents 
also frequently cite scientifically derived data to argue that wolf-control does not work for 
various reasons (Boertje, Keeck, & Paragi, 2010). Former Governor Knowles’ three criteria for 
                                                             
3 80% was a number given by Wade Willis in a telephone interview (personal communication, May 2013). 
Based on the number of Alaska resident hunting permits purchased in 2012 (101,231), and the 2012 
census estimate (741,449), the actual percentage of resident non-license holders is over 86%.  
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considering predator control appear frequently in wolf-control discourse. The three criteria are: 
that predator control must be cost effective, represent scientific scrutiny, and have broad public 
acceptability (National Research Council, 1997). Wolf-control opponents maintain that these 
three criteria should be a prerequisite for control efforts, and that the criteria are consistently 
ignored by the State.  
 
 Scientifically derived data are also used by wolf-control supporters to show the opposite of 
the above (Boertje, Keeck, & Paragi, 2010). Criticisms levied against the need for absolutely 
certain science are that it is a) virtually impossible to procure, b) cost prohibitive, and c) merely 
an obstructionist strategy (i.e. a mission impossible). 
 
  Wolf-control advocates also often consider themselves conservationists (Boertje, Keeck, & 
Paragi, 2010). One popular argument for boosting prey numbers through wolf-control is that 
wild game is superior to commercially available meat. Procuring and eating wild meat 
represents the continuance of a lifestyle and tradition. Commercially available meat is 
sometimes seen as product of cruel of factory farming techniques, whereas game lives in its 
natural state until being harvested (Sapontzis, 2012; Fröding & Peterson, 2011; Haefner, 
Dosman, Adamowicz, & Boxall, 2001).  
 
 Though Alaska specific, I believe that the preceding discussion is particularly important to 
bear in mind when considering the two Alaska, and the Western Alps case studies. Questions 
about how and how many wolves to remove are likely to surface once the Alpine wolf 
population passes a certain threshold. Impacts to wild and domestic prey, as well as human 
safety will likely determine that threshold. The conditions that existed when wolves were 
extirpated from most of Western Europe no longer exist.  It will likely be physically and socio-
politically difficult to maintain desired wolf abundance and density. 
 
 Safety-related rhetoric is a component of wolf management discourse in both Alaska and the 
Western Alps. Though the literature points to a low probability for human-wolf conflict (McNay, 
2002; Linnell, et al., 2002), such conflicts when they occur are have a high social impact. Events 
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such as a school teacher being killed outside the Village of Chignik Lake whilst jogging (Butler, 
Dale, Beckman, & Farley, 2011) (Butler, Dale, Beckman, & Farley, 2011) draw massive amounts 
of attention. Though they will be rare, similar future events are inevitable and should not be 
discounted. High-impact, low-probability events have huge impacts on society and 
corresponding implications for policy-makers (Slovik, 1987), as well policy advocates. McNay 
and others present evidence that rabies has been a main cause of wolf aggression towards 
humans (McNay, 2002). At least two recent cases of rabid wolves in Interior Alaska (Boyce, 
2013) keep safety concerns prescient, despite the statistically nanoscopic likelihood of negative 
wolf - human encounters. 
 
2.2.2  WESTERN ALPS: ITALY & SWITZERLAND 
 Wolves were extirpated throughout most of Western Europe within the last  100-300 years 
(Breitenmoser, 1998) due to a combination of environmental degradation and human 
persecution. During the period of extirpation, in the trinational Alp region of Italy, Switzerland 
and France an increasing human population consequentially altered the landscape. Humans 
deforested large areas for fuel, and to open the area to agricultural uses (Breitenmoser, 1998). 
This land use change decreased habitat for wolves, and their prey (e.g. roe deer, red deer, ibex, 
chamois, wild boar) (Breitenmoser, 1998). Concurrently, there was a great dependence on wild 
game as a source of food for local humans (Breitenmoser, 1998). As prey availability declined, 
competition between hunters and wolves increased (Breitenmoser, 1998), exacerbating 
preexisting conflict between these two predators.  
 
 Newly cleared land was utilized largely for livestock (e.g. sheep, cattle, and goats). Wolves 
adapted to the changing habitat by increasingly preying on domestic animals. Wolf predation on 
livestock led to further escalating conflict between wolf and human populations (Breitenmoser, 
1998). It also led to active efforts to exterminate wolves (Breitenmoser, 1998). The last known 
wild wolf in Switzerland was reportedly shot between 1800 and 1850 (Breitenmoser, 1998). The 
last known wild wolf was shot in France in 1937 (de Beaufort, 1987). When the first relevant 
wildlife conservation legislation, affecting wolves, was enacted in 1979 (Bern Convention) there 
was a remnant population of around 100 wolves in Italy (Lucchini, Galov, & Randi, 2004).  
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 Italy’s post World War II economic boom,  and technological advances led to a shift in human 
populations from the agricultural countryside to cities. This process of rural to urban migration 
was mirrored in Switzerland and France (Bätzing, 1991). As the human population in rural areas 
decreased in size, forests began to reclaim previously agricultural areas. As forested habitat 
increased so did prey (Apollonio, Andersen, & Putman, 2010). The wolf range gradually 
expanded out of the Province of Abruzzo, Italy, where the remnant wolf population had been 
virtually confined (Breitenmoser, 1998). Wolves recolonized much of the Italian Alps, and 
eventually were seen in Switzerland in 1992 and France in 1996 (Valière, et al., 2003).  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, protective legislation at national and supranational levels presents 
some management challenges. One particularly important challenge is social resistance to wolf 
recolonization. Most resistance to wolf recolonization has been from hunters, and livestock 
herders.  
 
 Hunting in the Western Alps persists primarily as a sport or traditional activity. Subsistence 
hunting does not exist in the Alps as is does in Alaska. Accordingly, hunting regulations in Italy 
and Switzerland are geared towards sport hunting. Though not uniformly against wolf 
recolonization, hunters are vocal and engaged enough to be represented at high-level 
discussions (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, May 2013; D. Gugolz, personal 
communication, April 2013).  
 
 For agriculturalists, sheep and goats are especially vulnerable to predation. Livestock 
vulnerability to predation is increased by practices that became standard in a predator free 
landscape (Breitenmoser, 1998). Livestock spend much of their time ranging freely and 
unsupervised (Breitenmoser, 1998). This practice is now considered ‘traditional’, and there is 
reluctance among livestock breeders to alter it. Employing protective measures, such as 
sheepdogs, can be cost prohibitive even with governmental subsidies  (M. Schwery, personal 
communication, April 2013).  
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 Besides practical difficulties, an emotional component is also at play. Despite much higher 
numbers of sheep killed by other factors (e.g. domestic dogs, weather events), wolves are often 
accused of threatening the industry and associated lifestyle. The informal institution of poaching 
has certainly slowed wolf recolonization. Nonetheless the trend is clearly in favor of a viable 
wolf population throughout the Alpine Arc (Marrucco & McIntire, 2010). 
 
2.2.3  COMPARISON 
 Clearly there are some monumental, historical differences between the two regions of study. 
In the Western Alps, a wolf population that nearly vanished is on the cusp of recolonizing part of 
its historical range. In Alaska, a wolf population exists that is, and has been more-or-less 
naturally regulated since the beginning of memory. In both cases, wolves have become a 
noteworthy management challenge as a result of social, economic, and environmental 
trajectories. Generally, both cases also self-juxtapose rural, local, traditional perspectives 
against top-down, urban-based, environmental imposition. 
 
2.3 CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS WOLVES AND NATURE 
 Lopez and others have suggested that wolf folklore and mythology originating in historical 
Europe is part of Europeans’ and North Americans’ collective subconscious (Lopez, 1978). The 
big bad wolf at the door of Little Red Riding Hood and the Three Little Pigs is likely to have 
earned its poor reputation in part from the pastoralism-induced conflict outlined in Chapter 2. 
Whether caused by agriculture-induced landscape changes, historical rabies outbreaks, 
interpretations of Bible verses, a historical human propensity to create a pathological ‘other’ to 
separate humans from nature and subjugate it, or something else, the wolf’s image has 
suffered. Positive cultural myths such as Remus and Romulus, the founders of Rome who were 
saved by a wolf, are infrequent. Anti-wolf attitudes were imported to the vast, American 
wilderness in need of civilizing (Nash, 2001). Settlers blazed across the continent logging and 
farming the frontier.  
 
 Even after conservation achieved a foothold in the United States, establishing national 
forests and parks, the wolf fared poorly. The NPS, for example, continued wolf-control into the 
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middle of the 20th Century. The international popularity of Jack London’s The Call of the Wild 
(1903) and White Fang (1906) are a reflection of and partial cause of the turn in public opinion. 
Aldo Leopold’s essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” published in A Sand County Almanac in 1949 
(Leopold, 1979) stirred a romantic plea for wolves in the context of espousing the importance of 
an ecosystem view of resources.  
 
 Between 1939 and 1941, Adolph Murie studied wolf and Dall sheep interactions in the newly 
formed Mt. McKinley National Park. The Wolves of Mt. McKinley (1944) and other studies of his, 
led to the discontinuation of predator eradication programs in National Parks.  
 
 Though such simplifications are perilous, the modern environmental movement began in the 
1960s (Melosi, 1993), and has been generally positive for wolves. In 1972 the United Nations 
(UN) created the UN Environment Program. A series of treaties followed, including the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) (1973), Bern Convention 
(1979), and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) (1992).  
 
 National programs such as the US ESA (1973) have shown a global trend in favor of 
protecting the environment and conservation of species including the wolf. Wolves are 
returning to their native range throughout the northern hemisphere. Public opinion of wolves in 
North America and Western Europe seem more positive than negative at present. This positivity 
is, of course, not universal. Some evidence points to an increase in negative attitude towards 
wolves in relation to wolf population expansions in the contiguous 48 states and Canada 
(Houston, Bruskotter, & Fan, 2010). Evidence also shows that rural communities especially 
frequently and vocally resist wolf conservation (Skogen & Krange, 2003).   
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CHAPTER 3 INSTITUTIONS, AGREEMENTS, & IMPACTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter 3, I present three case studies of transboundary wolf agreements. The first two 
cases take place in Alaska. The third case takes place in the Western Alps. In Alaska, I focus on 
sub-national, jurisdictional borders between federal lands managed by the NPS, and lands 
managed by the State of Alaska. In the Western Alps, I focus on the Italian - Swiss national 
border.  
 
 A discussion of relevant institutional contexts precedes the cases. Complete symmetry 
between case analyses proved ineffective. Instead, I tailored the analyses in such a way, that I 
hope clearly tells the stories of the agreements. Though structured differently, common 
analytical elements include:  
 Cross-case-study comparable diagrams. 
 Illustrative maps. 
 Descriptions of related agreements. 
 Analyses of the specific agreements chosen for close examination, including: 
o Discussion of the cessation of each agreement’s functionality. 
o Reflections on the outcome. 
o Current and future implications for wolves, stakeholders, and the environment 
in a larger context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
3.2 ALASKA CASE STUDIES 
 
3.2.1   INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT4 
 
3.2.1.1  INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS AFFECTING WOLVES IN ALASKA 
 In figure 3.1, US federal components are shaded dark, State of Alaska components are white, 
collaborative components are a gradient between dark and light, and federal components 
created with input from the State are filled with a dot pattern.  
                                                             
4 Both Alaska case studies share the same institutional context. 
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FIGURE 3.1: INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS AFFECTING WOLVES IN ALASKA 
 
 At the top of the institutional hierarchy affecting wolves in Alaska, is the US Constitution. This 
is the supreme law of the US, and it defines the powers of the government. The constitution 
gives Congress “the power to lease and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territory, natural resources, and other property belonging to the United States” (US Const., Art. 
44 
IV, § 3, cl. 2). The Commerce Clause (US Const., Art. 1, § 8) is often relevant in Federal - State 
questions. The Commerce Clause explicitly gives Congress authority over interstate, 
international commercial activities, and those involving tribes. Through case law, the Commerce 
Clause’s influence has been expanded to include even non-commercial, interstate natural 
resources (May, 2010). 
 
 The Property Clause (US Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2) gives Congress jurisdiction to protect 
federal lands and property as it sees fit (Freyfogle & Goble, 2009).  
 
 According to the Supremacy Clause (US Const., Art. VI, cl. 2), if a State law is created that 
contradicts a federal law made within the bounds of Congress’ authority, it is preempted by the 
federal law (Lurman & Rabinowitch, 2007). Federal law made to preempt state law, has the 
same effect; however, it should clearly express preemptive intent (May, 2010). 
 
 Below the Constitution box in the framework is the NPS Organic Act of 1916 (Organic Act)(16 
USC § 1). The Organic Act established the NPS under the Department of the Interior (DOI), and 
makes the NPS responsible for making rules and managing properties under their purview in 
such a way that the purpose of establishing the park is met.  
 
 On the same level as the Organic act is ANILCA (1980). When oil was discovered on the north 
slope of Alaska, it was determined that a pipeline to an ice-free port (i.e. Valdez) would be the 
best way to move the oil to markets outside of Alaska. In 1971, ANCSA was created to address 
the immediate need to settle land claims with Native entities, the State of Alaska, and the 
Federal Government (Haycox, 2002). ANCSA stipulated a concrete land selection process within 
a given time period, taking into account access rights (Haycox, 2002). ANILCA expedited 
solutions to land claims issues (Williss, 1985). Through ANCSA all entities began divvying up 
Alaska in a complicated land selection process. As of 2013, the process was still not complete.  
 
 ANILCA created or revised 15 NPS properties within the State, and laid ground rules about 
state and federal interaction somewhat differently than the status quo in the contiguous 48 
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states (Williss, 1985). One notable example of differences between National Parks in Alaska and 
in the contiguous states is the maintenance of traditional activities such as subsistence hunting 
within National Parks. Some of ANILCA’s complex and somewhat unusual directives for Federal 
and State management are discussed in context, where appropriate. 
 
 As mentioned above, Congress granted the NPS authority to create rules and regulations to 
manage lands under their purview in such a way as the foundational mandates are met. This is 
done via Management Plans. All further policies are to be based on the Management Plans 
(United States National Park Service, 2013). 
 
 At the next level is Theoretical Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. There is some precedent for the 
pursuance of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Property Clause if a federal property’s 
purposes are being endangered in a significant way from outside forces. This can also be found 
under ANILCA, wherein the Federal Government is responsible for guaranteeing subsistence 
opportunities for Native residents. If established goals (one of which is subsistence rights 
protections) are being endangered, a federal agency (e.g. the NPS) could invoke the Supremacy 
Clause and preempt Alaska resource management law with federal law. In both cases there is a 
preference for amiably settling disagreements or pursuing land trades before exercising blatant 
federal extraterritorial jurisdiction. Dave Mills, an NPS Subsistence Manager, told me “The bar 
would have to be set really high” (personal communication, May 2013) to pursue federal 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 
 Next is the Alaska State Constitution. The State Constitution requires the State to manage 
natural resources for the maximum benefit of all Alaskans. Under the Constitution is the BOG 
which is responsible for setting regulations regarding wildlife in Alaska. The ADFG is responsible 
for providing science to the BOG, and managing fish and game resources in line with BOG 
regulations. 
 
 The Alaska IM Law (AS 16.05.255(e)-(g) and (j)) dictates that consumptive use of big game 
prey is the preferred use of big game (i.e. over viewing and other non-consumptive uses). Under 
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the IM law, game should be managed for sustained high levels of human harvest. The law also 
prevents the BOG from significantly reducing allowable harvest unless IM has already been 
undertaken. Outside of predator control, IM can consist of habitat improvement techniques, 
such as prescribed burns. Determinations that IM would be ineffective, inappropriate (such as 
on NPS lands), or against the best interest of subsistence uses exempt the BOG from IM 
mandates.   
 
 The Master Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) was created as one of several Master 
Memoranda of Understanding under ANILCA between federal agencies and the State of Alaska 
(United States National Park Service, 2006). This is discussed in more detail below.  
 
 The ADFG is responsible (or at least co-responsible) for the management of all wildlife in 
Alaska. The department also undertakes specific management actions (e.g. wolf-control). An 
exception to this is when State policy contradicts a federal policy on federally owned land. In 
these cases, the NPS has ultimate control through a number of means, even though the State 
has authority in the absence of a contradiction (Lurman & Rabinowitch, 2007). 
 
3.2.1.2  MASTER MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: AGREEING TO AGREE (& DISAGREE) 
 In the wake of ANILCA, each of the federal land management agencies created an MMoU 
with the ADFG. The MMoU between the ADFG, and NPS was signed by representatives of both 
agencies in 1982. It is a framing document stating recognition of shared as well as contrasting 
responsibilities between the two agencies. The MMoU set ground rules for cooperation, such as 
in permitting (e.g. entrance onto lands in the context of research), consulting/ informing (e.g. 
when developing policy that may affect goals of the other agency), resolving disagreements 
within agency hierarchies before publicly expressing a position, and meeting annually.   
 
 The MMoU “establishes procedural guidelines by which parties shall cooperate, but does not 
create legally enforceable obligations or rights.” Almost all representatives with whom I spoke, 
from both the ADFG and the NPS wanted to ensure I was aware of and familiar with the MMoU. 
At the same time, no representatives had invoked it forthrightly in any agreement or 
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interagency conversation. Further, no one identified specific portions of the MMoU they 
thought were particularly salient or applicable. Cognizance of the general principle was iterated 
and reiterated, but no agency representatives ventured to, as one contact put it “embark on a 
theoretical treatise” as to what extent the MMoU might have the ability to influence 
collaborative management discussions or agreements (J. Yuhas, personal communication, May 
2013). The process of implementation, said the ADFG’s Brad Palach, “should just be a local 
phone call” (personal communication, April, 2013). 
 
 The MMoU is as important as it is unimportant. The clear majority of interviewees stressed 
the non-legally binding nature of the MMoU, though no contacts wanted to have defied the 
precepts of the MMoU. This sort of latent, omnipresent trans-agency agreement seems relevant 
at the (ADFG) management level, but the ADFG does not make its own regulations. If the MMoU 
applies to the regulatory (BOG) level, transboundary managemental coherence with the NPS 
should/ could be better.   
 
 Attempts to gauge the relevance of the MMoU at the BOG level unearthed an inconclusive 
yet interesting dispute. One representative for the ADFG posited a clear delineation, with the 
BOG as an independent entity from the ADFG (B. Palach, personal communication, April 2013). 
An anti-wolf-control interest group representative strongly disagreed and explained the 
inherent organizational connectedness of the BOG and ADFG (W. Willis, personal 
communication, May 2013).  
 
 One further example of divergent conceptualizations can be found in the BOG, 2010 Interior 
Region Meeting proposals (the proposal process is discussed in more detail below) (Alaska 
Board of Game, 2010). The Anchorage Fish and Game Advisory Committee stated in a proposal 
to expand the Denali Wolf Buffer that the ADFG has “an obligation to adapt management on 
adjacent lands” under the MMoU and Denali’s mandates. I called the Anchorage Fish and Game 
Advisory Committee Board’s Regional Coordinator, Sherry Wright. Wright seemed surprised at 
the inclusion of the reference to the MMoU in the proposal and referred me to an ADFG Federal 
Subsistence Liaison Team Leader (personal communication, May, 2013). Jennifer Yuhas, the 
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ADF&G Federal Subsistence Liaison Team Leader, stated that “The signing agencies are of course 
cognizant of their existing agreements, such as the Master Memoranda of Understanding,” but 
was unable to discuss “the document’s ‘ability’ to influence collaborative management 
decisions,” except to say that it is “dependent upon the implementers of that agreement at any 
given time” (personal communication, May 2013). Wright also recommended looking into the 
contemporary composition of the Advisory Committee and consulting those members. Wade 
Willis, a member of the committee at that time (2010), and a vocal critic of many Alaska 
predator control programs shared a different point of view.  
 
 Willis postulated an obligation on the ADFG’s part to “uphold the spirit of the MMoU” 
(personal communication, May, 2013). Continuing, Willis insisted the BOG is part of the system, 
inseparable from ADFG and likewise obligated to take the MMoU into account in decision 
making (i.e. ADFG and BOG are not actually separate entities). 
 
3.2.1.3  ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS IN ALASKA WOLF POLICY 
 Understanding and presenting the complex entity relationships in Alaska wolf policy proved 
complicated. The Entity Relationships in Alaska Wolf Policy diagram (Figure 3.2) illustrates a 
simplified version of the system.  
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FIGURE 3.2: ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS IN ALASKA WOLF POLICY 
 
 Ovals represent the main components. Arrows represent the main direction of influence. I 
intended words and short phrases associated with each arrow to describe the relationship 
between two entities. Word choices do contain implications of power relationships. In reality, 
explicit mono-directional power relationships (almost?) never exist. Redundancy between entity 
relationship diagrams and institutional levels diagrams is intentional. They are two different 
ways of illustrating the same system to show different aspects of it.  
 
 The US Constitution gives Congress authority, especially through: the Commerce Clause, 
Property Clause, and Supremacy Clause and Preemption to create federal laws which are 
supreme over conflicting state laws and regulations such as regulations created by the BOG. It 
also gives Congress the authority to initiate an amendment to the Constitution, and create 
federal agencies, whose direction it defines. When federal agencies interpret their 
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Congressional mandates, those policies also become federal law. The public is also invited to 
provide input in the crafting of federal agency management plans. Public input is influential in 
planning, but non-binding.  
 
 The Alaska Constitution gives authority to laws such as the IM Law, which the BOG must 
follow in their regulatory actions. The Alaska Constitution also defines the roles of the Governor 
of Alaska, and the Legislature. The Governor has the power to appoint the members of the BOG, 
but his or her appointment must be confirmed by the Legislature. Concerned members of the 
Alaskan public can elect the governor and legislature based on their policy direction. The BOG 
accepts regulatory proposals from Local Advisory Committees (made up of local experts), 
federal agencies, the American public in general, NGOs, and the ADFG. Local Advisory 
Committees are normally a pro-hunting distillation of concerned members of the Alaskan public. 
Local Advisory Committees can propose to the ADFG as well. The ADFG effectively propose 
regulations to themselves before presenting them to the BOG.  
 
 Both concerned members of the Alaskan public and the public at large can nudge NGOs in 
various directions by providing or withholding (normally financial) support.  
 
 The BOG considers all proposals and dictates management action to be executed by the 
ADFG. ADFG can consult with federal agencies before undertaking wolf-control on their own, 
and/ or by permitting members of the Alaskan public to hunt, trap, and/ or participate in other 
means of wolf-control. Concerned (i.e. interested) members of the Alaskan public are eligible to 
receive permits to participate in aerial wolf-control. 
 
3.2.2  AGREEMENT 1 - YUKON-CHARLEY RIVERS NATIONAL PRESERVE & STATE OF ALASKA  
 
3.2.2.1  CASE SPECIFIC HISTORY 
 Pre-historically, ancestors of the Han Athabaskans inhabited the area presently proximal to 
Yukon-Charley National Preserve (Yukon-Charley) (United States National Park Service, 2013). 
Fur traders on the Yukon River appeared in the mid-1800s, then miners and missionaries. Small-
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scale mining, using laborious hand methods began before and continued after large-scale 
dredging. Large-scale mining lasted from the 1930s to the beginning of World War II (United 
States National Park Service, 2013).  
 
 Geographically, Yukon-Charley is located in interior Alaska. The Yukon and Charley rivers, 
which meet in the preserve have long been a winter and summer transportation route in the 
region. The preserve, established by Congress through ANILCA in 1980, is 10,225 square km, and 
borders Yukon, Canada on one side, as well as state land, and a small portion of the Steese 
National Conservation Area (Bureau of Land Management [BLM]).  
 
 The Preserve is divided by three State GMUs: 25B, 25C, and 20E, and borders 20B, and 20D. 
Circle (pop. 61), Central (pop. 135), and Eagle (pop. 71) (Alaska Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development, 2010) are the main population centers close to the Preserve. Several 
smaller communities and some private land exist within the Preserve boundary. The NPS field 
office is in Eagle, but the official Preserve headquarters is in Fairbanks, around 580 road 
kilometers away. Eagle is one of two Alaskan towns that had produced official proclamations 
after the ANILCA-related designation of protected federal lands (The other town is Cantwell, 
which is very close to the second case study [Denali] study area). The proclamations stated that 
the towns would not support NPS authorities, enforce NPS regulations, and would shelter 
individuals who broke the regulations (Shapiro, 2012). These proclamations highlight local 
resistance to federal land management.  
 
 Fairbanks is where a large proportion of people, who hunt in and around the preserve are 
based. Although remote, Yukon-Charley is more accessible by car (via the aforementioned 
towns) and boat than many places in Interior Alaska. Like much of Alaska the Preserve is part of 
a greater region of largely unimpacted and unfragmented habitat, maintaining a full suite of 
native flora and fauna. 
 
 According to Yukon-Charley Superintendent Greg Dudgeon (personal communication, April, 
2013) there was an attempt during the land selection process to follow logical ecological 
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demarcations; however, State and Native entities had temporal prerogative. For Alaska and 
Native entities, the land selection process was (and in some cases still is) also complicated. 
Hence, the borders of the Preserve are a combination of natural, and geometrical, artificial 
borders with both concave and convex portions (see Figure 3.3).  
 
FIGURE 3.3: YUKON-CHARL EY CASE STUDY DETAIL MAP 
 
These concave portions are particularly important for the agreement between the State of 
Alaska and Yukon-Charley. The ‘notch’ south of the Yukon River, is where wolves taken in State 
predator control efforts most severely affects ‘Preserve packs’ (discussed below); thus affecting 
other Yukon-Charley resources, research, and management goals. 
 
 Further complicating transboundary wildlife management implications, the southern lobe of 
the Yukon-Charley is located in the middle of the Fortymile Caribou Herd calving ground (see 
Figure 3.4).  
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FIGURE 3.4: FORTYMILE CARIBOU RANGE & YUKON-CHARLEY NATIONAL PRESERVE MAP 
 
Discussed in more detail below, State predator control efforts focus on the area around the 
calving ground to restore and maintain the caribou herd. In the words of ADFG Regional Director 
David James: “It’s like a divine joke. The importance and location of the Fortymile Herd and the 
location of the Preserve… there couldn’t be a better setup for a conflict” (personal 
communication, May 2013).  
 
3.2.2.2  PREDECESSOR TO AGREEMENT (FORTYMIL E PLAN CONSENSUS PROCESS) 
 Details of the Fortymile Plan Consensus Process have been thoroughly and eloquently 
recorded elsewhere (Todd, 1995), however, some background is necessary to understand the 
agreement to limit State wolf-control impacts to Yukon-Charley wolves (examined in depth for 
this case study).  
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 First, there are technical similarities between this plan and the agreement discussed below. 
Technical similarities most relevant to both this predecessor agreement and the agreement 
below can be seen in strategies to minimize impact to Yukon-Charley wolves when conducting 
predator control. Second, personal and specific-level interagency relationships developed 
significantly in the timeframe of the Fortymile concensus process. David James, ADFG Regional 
Supervisor, said when asked about the relationship about the two agreements “You should 
know by now Brett, everything is related” (personal communication, May 2013). How everything 
is related however, is complicated.  
 
 Among interviewees from both the ADFG and the NPS, the consensus is that during the 
Knowles (Democratic) administration (1994-2002) the political climate was more conducive to 
collaboration between state and federal agencies than it has been since. This story begins in 
1994, when Dave Mills was Superintendent of Yukon-Charley. Mills first became involved in 
Yukon-Charley and State of Alaska discussions during the year-long planning process for the 
Fortymile Caribou Herd Management Plan. The development of the plan, initiated by the ADFG 
and supported by the NPS, BLM, and US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), was facilitated by 
conflict resolution specialist Dr. Susan Todd.  
 
The planning processes was intended to involve as many stakeholder groups as possible at 
the table, and find consensus among all parties to reverse the trending decline of the Fortymile 
Caribou Herd. As mentioned above, Yukon-Charley intersects a large portion of the herd’s 
calving ground. Calving ground is important to a herd. Sufficient calves need to be born and 
survive to adulthood to perpetuate the herd and maintain its size. Wolf and bear predation are 
the primary limiting factors to recruitment (National Research Council, 1997).  
 
The main foci of the plan were: Maintaining habitat quality, limiting human harvest, 
decreasing predation (i.e. from wolves and bears), monitoring effectiveness of measures, 
increasing public awareness, and creating an example for public participation in the future.   
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A number of wolf packs were identified as having a primary range within Yukon-Charley. 
Other packs and the caribou herd’s territories also intersected the preserve. Mills’ role as 
superintendent was to manage Yukon-Charley as intended by Congress. This management 
included upholding NPS policies, and interacting with such agencies as the ADFG at local levels.  
 
Based on the plan, the ADFG engaged in non-lethal wolf-control from 1997-2001. This 
involved sterilizing Alpha animals and moving sub-Alpha animals to other areas to decrease the 
overall number of wolves and predation on caribou in the Fortymile region. As discussed in 
2.2.1.1, this non-lethal control and was far less controversial, and far more expensive than lethal 
wolf-control.  
 
 Mills and James explained that during this period, although wolves could still be hunted and 
trapped within the Preserve boundaries, there was a negotiated agreement between the NPS 
and the ADFG that sterilization and relocation would not be done on Yukon -Charley wolves 
(personal communications, May 2013). The ADFG agreed that packs identified as having their 
primary range within Yukon-Charley would not be ‘treated’ (i.e. sterilized and/ or relocated).  
 
A number of factors went into identifying a wolf pack’s primary range. Factors included 
denning locations, time spent within Yukon-Charley’s boundaries, and movement patterns. The 
process, according to Mills was “pretty difficult on everybody,” (personal communication, May 
2013) but the goodwill and mutual respect among participants from both agencies remains 
apparent even now in my interviews. There seems to be a nostalgic undercurrent regarding past 
cooperation. This approach came to a stop in 2001. As Mills put it “Predator control is 
expensive, but treatment is way more expensive” (personal communication, April 2013), James 
confirmed this. In contrast to the Fortymile Caribou Herd Management Plan subsequent  
Fortymile Caribou plans have been titled Fortymile Caribou Herd Harvest Plans, a meaningful 
semantic difference. No interviewees expressed awareness of earnest, official efforts to bring 
the diverse stakeholder audience back to the table.  
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There was a lag time in the early 2000s before wolf-control became a concern for Yukon-
Charley management again. Pushback against wolf-control in the form of two citizens’ initiatives 
banning and re-banning public land-and-shoot hunting (see 2.2.1.1) slowed wolf-control efforts. 
According to Mills the pushback translated into limited ADFG helicopters and personnel being 
used in wolf-control (personal communication, April 2013). Wolf-control at this time focused on 
the Fortymile area near Tok. This area, far from Yukon-Charley was the focus of wolf-control 
efforts despite the desire by ADFG to remove wolves closer to the Yukon-Charley; “gas is 
expensive,” Mills postulated as a reason for basing ADFG wolf-control efforts near Tok (personal 
communication, April 2013).    
 
3.2.2.3  AGREEMENT: MINIMIZE STATE WOLF-CONTROL IMPACTS ON YUKON-CHARL EY WOLVES 
 According to David James, before 2009 most wolf-control was carried out by private hunters 
and trappers. James referred to this as the “Private Caribou Protection Plan” (i.e. private citizens 
protecting caribou from wolf predation). In some areas, according to James, permitting public 
aerial wolf removal is effective. He also stated that this was not so in the Fortymile region due to 
its relative remoteness. In order to meet wolf removal goals, ADFG aerial action became 
imminent. James saw the immediate potential for conflict with the NPS.  
 
 In spring of 2009, James called Greg Dudgeon, who had recently succeeded Dave Mills as 
Superintendent of Yukon-Charley. The idea, according to James was to “stretch both mandates 
as close to the boundary as possible” to “live peacefully” (personal communication, May 2013). 
Greg Dudgeon remembers a call on a Friday in April or May. ADFG was planning on conducting 
aerial, fixed wing gunman, wolf-control on State managed lands adjacent to Yukon-Charley that 
weekend (G. Dudgeon, personal communication, April 2013).  
 
 In spring 2009, ADFG’s plans were to remove 60-80% of wolves in the 48,563km2 Fortymile 
region. The Fortymile region includes a large portion of Yukon-Charley. Removing this number of 
wolves can theoretically be done without entering Yukon-Charley land or airspace because of 
wolves’ transboundary nature (i.e. wolves crossing the border onto State land), and such 
boundary features as the notch mentioned above. “We’re talking about wolves in there chewing 
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on caribou calves” David James quipped, also noting that removal goals have up to present been 
unattainable.  
 
 David James offered Greg Dudgeon a completely informal agreement. Both James and 
Dudgeon confirmed that records for the agreement are unavailable as conversations were one-
on-one. The offer consisted of the following protocol: 
 ADFG would remove all telemetry gear from helicopters and planes used in the wolf-
control effort. 
 ADFG would hire a ‘main plane’. 
 The main plane would have NPS research wolf radio-collar frequencies, supplied by 
Yukon-Charley. 
 ‘Spotter planes’ would look for wolf tracks (in the snow) and find packs. 
 Once a pack was located, the main plane would be called. 
 The main plane would scan for NPS radio collar frequencies. 
 If NPS frequencies were found, the pack was considered a Yukon-Charley wolf pack and 
flagged. 
 If NPS frequencies were not found, the pack was to be removed. 
 ADFG would use helicopters to shoot wolves. Shooters would “do their best” not to 
shoot flagged, radio collared wolves. 
 
 This agreement allowed David James to potentially remove the percentage of wolves 
required by the BOG. Protecting the entire pack, conversely, would not have allowed ADFG wolf-
control efforts to remove the required percentage of wolves set out by the BOG. Whether or not 
the targeted number of wolves can be removed is one thing, but not even attempting to remove 
this quantity of wolves would have been illegal on the part of ADFG (D. James, personal 
communication, May 2013).  
 
 For Greg Dudgeon, this was an opportunity to support Yukon-Charley’s mission to provide for 
natural processes to evolve, and to observe rather than manipulate (G. Dudgeon, personal 
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communication, May 2013). Dudgeon was interested in protecting wolves with a home range in 
the preserve, especially those viewed by Yukon-Charley as packs vulnerable to ADFG wolf-
control. The NPS also had a 16 year ongoing radio-collared wolf study. NPS shared collar 
frequencies and information on the Alpha animals and packs with ADFG (G. Dudgeon, personal 
communication, April 2013).  
 
 The State cannot legally remove wolves within Yukon-Charley without NPS permission. The 
incentive for the State to agree was according to David James, to “play well in the sandbox”, and 
prevent retaliatory hunting closures on Yukon-Charley lands (D. James, personal 
communication, May 2013). He feared closures would anger the “blood and guts group” (i.e. 
hunters). Further, wolf closures on Yukon-Charley lands would prevent hunters from removing 
wolves within the preserve. Wolves hunted and trapped by private citizen within Yukon-Charley 
assisted with facilitating recovery of the Fortymile herd (D. James, personal communication, 
May 2013). 
 
3.2.2.4  CESSATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
 The second year of the agreement was 2010. Again, David James called Greg Dudgeon before 
the wolf-control effort was to begin (D. James, personal communication, May 2013; G. Dudgeon, 
personal communication, April 2013). Again, the telemetry and pack information was provided 
to the ADFG, as was according to Dudgeon, radio-telemetry equipment.  
 
 In the days following the initial contact, David James called Dudgeon to inform him that 
ADFG had killed all four wolves from one pack, and that two of those had radio collars (D. James, 
personal communication, May 2013; G. Dudgeon, personal communication, April 2013). Shortly 
thereafter, Dudgeon granted an interview to Tim Mowry, a reporter with the Fairbanks Daily 
News-miner (March 18, 2010), and was quoted as saying “We asked that all collared animals 
and packs with them be avoided, (the ADFG) decided to do what they were going to do and in 
this case a pack has been eliminated” (Mowry, Alaska, federal officials at odds over shooting of 
Yukon-Charley collared wolves, 2010) David James was also quoted as saying the killing of 
collared wolves was a mistake, that a procedure had not worked properly and was a result of 
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“some confusion on the part of staff,” “some complicated factors,” and possibly a result of collar 
malfunction or misinterpretation of radio frequencies (Mowry, Alaska, federal officials at odds 
over shooting of Yukon-Charley collared wolves, 2010).  
 
 A series of back and forth Newsminer articles followed (Mowry, Alaska preserve looks for 
answers in wolf kills, 2010; Mowry, State, feds still spar over Alaska wolf kills, 2010; Mowry, 
State, federal officials pledge to work together after Alaska wolf kill, 2010). Dudgeon told me 
that he felt misrepresented as trying to make the State look bad. James simply said that the 
“Park Service was pissed off” (personal communication, May 2013). David James halted wolf-
control adjacent to the park until the issue could be sorted out. Greg Dudgeon closed general 
hunting and trapping within the Preserve (Mowry, Park Service closes sport hunting, trapping of 
wolves in Yukon-Charley preserve, 2010) to respond to a “sudden drop in already precarious 
Preserve wolf population numbers” (personal communication, April 2013). Both James and 
Dudgeon agreed that the media “always gets it wrong” (D. James, personal communication, May 
2013). 
 
 The explanation provided by David James about the circumstances corresponds loosely with 
the Newsminer reports. James told me that the spotter had seen a pack with two collars, and 
called the main plane. The main plane was unable to retrieve a signal and concluded that the 
collars were defunct, and probably from another, past, study. The decision was made to remove 
the wolves. It turned out that the collars were live, but that the frequencies had not been 
transcribed properly. Neither James nor Dudgeon addressed culpability for the transcription 
error. 
 
 In 2011, communication had broken down. Greg Dudgeon saw the “whole thing [devolve] 
into a Federal versus State thing” (personal communication, April 2013). David James had 
assumed the same type of agreement as the preceding years would continue (personal 
communication, May 2013). Inconclusive talks ensued. Ultimately, according to James, the NPS 
wanted more protection for the wolves than ADFG could concede. Both parties expressed a 
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deep disappointment that the agreement did not succeed. Both also blamed conflicting 
mandates. At least publicly each understood the other’s dilemma.   
 
3.2.2.5  INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Figure 3.5 displays the agreement on the institutional levels framework introduced with 
Figure 3.1.  
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FIGURE 3.5: INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS IN YUKON-CHARL EY AGREEMENT 
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The arrows here represent influences in the agreement. Although the MMoU is not explicitly 
implicated, the main principles are represented. The agreement took place at the agency level, 
with stronger input from the ADFG. The ADFG both conceived of the agreement and had the 
primary power to extinguish it. NPS management’s end of the agreement was to share radio-
telemetry frequencies and equipment. 
 
 Figure 3.6 is a modification to the Entity Relationships in Alaska Wolf Policy diagram (Figure 
3.2).  
 
FIGURE 3.6: ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS SPECIFIC TO YUKON-CHARL EY AGREEMENT 
 
Figure 3.6 highlights the entities and relationships involved in the crafting, execution, and 
eventual cessation of the agreement. David James and Greg Dudgeon were able to circumvent 
many of the normally active entity relationships. The BOG was mandated by their interpretation 
of the IM Law to direct the ADFG to engage in wolf-control. The NPS agreed to the action based 
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on Yukon-Charley management’s interpretations of federal mandates. Yukon-Charley facilitated 
the agreement in practical ways. 
 
3.2.2.6  DISCUSSION 
 David James and Greg Dudgeon stressed that the agreement took place in a tense political 
climate. Both also thought that the political climate now (spring 2013) is even worse. James 
further confided that the agreement simply could not happen in the current political climate 
(personal communication, May 2013). My interviews and the Newsminer articles dated March 
18, 2010; March 19, 2010; March 27, 2010; March 30, 2010; and April 16, 2010, shine some 
further light on the reasons the agreement ultimately failed. First, disagreements arose as to the 
exact terms and execution of the agreement. The informality and lack of documentation 
necessary for the agreement to be created meant there was nothing to reference in strained 
discussions. Second, the agreement’s level of separation from institutional structures meant no 
venue for grievances existed. Finally, when the two individuals who had brokered the 
agreement could no longer constructively communicate, no organizational framework was in 
place to sustain the agreement. 
 
 While the value of the agreement for Yukon-Charley was clear (i.e. protection of Preserve 
wolves), the value for the State is less clear. On one hand, Greg Dudgeon not accepting the same 
agreement the third year seems obstinate; the classic ‘give him an inch and he’ll take a mile’. 
David James’ insistence of offering an agreement seems almost altruistic. On the other hand, 
Yukon-Charley taking part in the agreement, even to protect some preserve wolves, contains a 
latent stamp-of-approval from the NPS on an Alaska predator control effort.   
 
3.2.2.7  IMPLICATIONS  
 I asked David James if there were any active relicts of the agreement. He explained the ‘Judas 
Wolf’ strategy of predator control. In this strategy, one wolf is collared. The collared wolf goes 
back to its pack. State biologists follow the signal and “take out the pack,” but leave the Judas 
Wolf. The Judas Wolf joins a new pack; wash-rinse-repeat. Present policy for wolf-control efforts 
on lands adjacent to Yukon-Charley is similar insofar as instructions are to leave one collared 
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wolf in each pack. The exception to the similarity is that no Judas wolves are placed in Yukon-
Charley packs, and preserve packs are not targeted. Otherwise predator control goes “right up 
to the line” (D. James, personal communication, May 2013).  
 
 Yukon-Charley outreach suggests that preserve wolves have been so reduced by wolf-control 
efforts outside of its boundaries that they no longer represent a healthy, natural population 
(United States National Park Service, 2013). At the same time, the 2012-2018 ADFG Fortymile 
Harvest Plan calls for continued wolf-control carried out by private citizens and supplemented 
by ADFG biologists as necessary to meet regional IM goals for caribou harvest. Additionally, the 
2012-2013 ADFG Wolf Predator Control Programs supplement (Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game, 2012) shows wolf-control area boundaries encompassing roughly three quarters of the 
Yukon-Charley.  
 
 ADFG wolf-control capacity and caribou habitat carrying capacity may become game 
changers in the region. Despite the Fortymile Caribou Herd’s importance as a cultural resource 
to both Alaskan Native and Yukon First Nations, wolf-control is expensive. While many 
interviewees confirmed the costliness of wolf-control, David James went into further detail. 
James said bluntly, that the ADFG cannot handle more, active predator control programs than 
they have now (personal communication, May 2013). Not only can there be no additive 
predator control programs under the present budget, but ADFG has been told to expect 
austerity over the next two to three years, James said.  
 
James additionally spoke about carrying capacity thresholds in the Fortymile region. He 
posits, that recent nutritional analyses indicate an upper limit of forage availability for the 
Fortymile herd. James touted ADFG’s one-hundred percent success rate when asking BOG to 
modify “ridiculous” population objectives for caribou (personal communication, May 2013). The 
implication would be that Fortymile caribou populations are approaching their habitat’s carrying 
capacity, and when they reach that biological threshold wolf-control will be reduced. This would 
functionally be true regardless of higher-level (e.g. BOG), political proclivities. 
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Yukon-Charley is a remote place. Many of the small populated places within and around the 
preserve do depend on wild game for food. Many of these populations also depend on wild 
game as part of a way of life (United States National Park Service, 2013). For these human 
populations the increasing caribou herd is generally seen as positive (Van Lanen, Stevens, 
Brown, Maracle, & Koster, 2012). The NPS could (and has) closed Yukon-Charley to the hunting 
of one or more species, including wolves and bears (Mowry, Park Service closes sport hunting, 
trapping of wolves in Yukon-Charley preserve, 2010). These closures further strain already tense 
relationships between the NPS and ADFG. Also, despite the Yukon-Charley’s lack of prominence 
in the public eye (e.g. in comparison to Denali, the location of the following case study), it is one 
of a number of examples of NPS and State conflict over the topic of wolf-control. Encampments 
on both sides of the proverbial river will be interested in the evolving situation. 
 
3.2.3   AGREEMENT 2 – DENALI NATIONAL PARK & STATE OF ALASKA 
 
3.2.3.1  CASE SPECIFIC HISTORY 
 Although the region around Denali National Park and Preserve (Denali) has been inhabited by 
humans for more than 11,000 years, the high altitude and severe winter conditions were 
prohibitive to permanent settlement within what is now the Park and Preserve. Athabascan 
peoples are thought to have been in the region 1,000 to 15,000 years ago. In more recent times 
Koyukon, Tanana, and Dena’ina People inhabited the Park region (United States National Park 
Service, 2013). 
 
 What is now Denali National Park and Preserve was conceived when Charles Alexander 
Sheldon became concerned that development was endangering Dall sheep in the region (United 
States National Park Service, 2013). He petitioned Congress and the Alaskan people to create a 
preserve for the species. This led to the establishment of the original Mount McKinley National 
Park in 1917. In 1980, through ANILCA, Mt. McKinley was incorporated into the expansive Denali 
National Park and Preserve, which is now over 24,500 km2 (United States National Park Service, 
2013).  
 
66 
 Denali’s borders are primarily artificial geometric borders, including a concave notch at the 
northeast of the Park (see Figure 3.7).  
 
FIGURE 3.7: DENALI CASE STUDY MAP 
 
This notch, like the notch in Yukon-Charley, was a result of the land selection process. Alaska 
selected the notch during the land selection process (i.e. before the expansion to Denali 
National Park and Preserve through ANILCA). Apparently, what is now the Stampede Trail was 
meant to be a road providing truck access to mines (Audio for Unit 20 Wolf Closure Proposals, 
February 26 - March 7, 2010). The intent for Denali to procure the notch through land trade has 
existed from early on (P. Hooge, personal communication, April 2013).  
 
 The notch is commonly known as the ‘Wolf Townships’  (N. Bale, personal communication, 
May 2013). The moniker refers to the Wolf Townships ecological function as winter habitat for 
Denali’s Caribou. Wolves follow the caribou’s migration into the area. The Wolf Townships 
favorable winter conditions for wildlife complement the surrounding Park’s favorable non-
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winter conditions (N. Bale, personal communication, May 2013). Many people, such as Denali 
Citizens Council President, Nancy Bale, see the Wolf Townships as ‘ecologically part of the Park’.  
 
 The area acquired more recognition courtesy of John Krakauer’s biography of Chris 
McCandless, Into the Wild. The biography ends with Chris McCandless dying of starvation in an 
abandoned bus on the Stampede Trail in 1992 (Krakauer, 1996). Present day tourists are 
rescued regularly, when trying to retrace McCandless’  adventure. Krakauer’s book is only one of 
many examples of popular culture contributing to Denali’s wilderness mystique.   Wilderness 
romanticism brings tourists. 
 
 The ecological oneness of Denali and the Wolf Townships causes socio-ecological concerns. 
The State manages wildlife in the Wolf Townships. Precluding a buffer (as discussed here) 
hunting and trapping of wolves is normally allowed in the Wolf Townships. The majority of 
tourists who visit Denali, access the Park on the Park Road (see Figure 3.7). Many of them come 
to Alaska, and Denali to experience wilderness. Wolf sightings can contribute to a wilderness 
experience (United States National Park Service, 2013). Wolf packs with territories intersecting 
the Park Road are somewhat frequently seen by visitors (United States National Park Service, 
2013). The territories of these wolf packs sometimes also intersect the Wolf Townships, 
especially in winter. When wolves from these packs are hunted and trapped (i.e. removed) in 
the Wolf Townships, wolves are less likely to be seen by visitors to the Park.  
 
 The BOG instituted the Denali Wolf Buffer(s) to protect wolf viewing, a non-consumptive use 
of the wolf as a resource. Many tourists from out of state and Alaskans tourists enjoy viewing 
and photographing wolves. From an Alaska Constitutional standpoint, wildlife viewing is a 
benefit for Alaskans. This benefit is manifest in enjoyment, tourism economics, etc. These non-
consumptive benefits must be considered by the BOG alongside the benefits received from 
hunting and trapping wolves.  
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3.2.3.2  DENALI WOLF BUFFER AGREEMENT 
 Unlike the Yukon-Charley agreement, the Denali Wolf Buffer agreement did not begin with or 
even include NPS participation until 2010. At that time, the buffer was removed. At BOG 
meetings, public testimony and discussions about wolves provide never-ending material. No 
doubt many testimonies and discussions, not explored in what follows, were influential. The 
following synopsis of events represents a conscious decision on my part to focus solely on 
meetings leading to tangible changes to the buffer.  
 
1992 
 The first version of the Denali Wolf Buffer appeared in 1992 (Alaska Board of Game, 1992). 
Media attention to an increasingly aggressive Alaskan wolf-control program enticed then 
Governor Hickel to call for a ‘Wolf Summit’ (Regelin, 2002). The Wolf Summit included various 
State and national interest groups (Regelin, 2002). Until the Wolf Summit resulted in a strategic 
plan, Hickel halted predator control (Regelin, 2002). In November, 1992 the ADFG proposed a 
closure of GMU 14C. The decision to close around 1500km2 was viewed by the BOG as 
‘housekeeping’ (Alaska Board of Game, 1992). The action intended to placate “those who 
believe a hunting closure will increase opportunities to view wolves and those that are against 
wolf hunting” (Alaska Board of Game, 1992).  
 
The action was rescinded in November of 1993. The BOG rescinded the closure because the 
proposal had been based on the Wolf Summit recommendations (Alaska Board of Game, 1993). 
Public backlash against predator control plans had spurred the BOG to rescind most elements of 
the strategic plan and all its implementation plans in June, 1993. The BOG revised the Strategic 
Plan and retitled it The Wolf Conservation and Management Policy for Alaska (Regelin, 2002). 
 
2000 
 The Denali Wolf Buffer reappeared in 2000. Private citizens, photographers, and 
conservationists Dorothy and Leo Keeler proposed a new buffer to the BOG (Alaska Board of 
Game, 2000). The buffer was meant to protect wolves in a large area around Denali from 
hunting and trapping. In the proposal to the BOG, wolf protection was justified for ongoing 
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research, and viewing opportunities (Alaska Board of Game, 2000).The BOG adopted the 
proposal, amended to cover a smaller area than proposed (Alaska Board of Game, 2000). 
Around 28 km2 was closed in the wolf townships to protect one pack’s range.  
 
2001 
 The ADFG returned with another proposal in 2001 (Alaska Board of Game, 2001). The 
proposal added around 50km2, for a total buffer of around 187km2. This is the smaller of the 
two buffers, seen along the Parks Highway in Figure 3.7. In the proposal, the ADFG requested 
the buffer expansion to provide easier to identify landmarks than the previous demarcation. The 
proposal also cited better protection for a pack commonly viewed by tourists. The BOG granted 
the expansion of the buffer, but also imposed a sunset clause, ending provisions in March 31, 
2002 (Alaska Board of Game, 2001).  
 
2002 
 The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, an environmental NGO, submitted two proposals at the March 
BOG meeting in Fairbanks (Alaska Board of Game, 2002). Proposal 121 would have increased the 
buffer zone to 1300km2. Proposal 122 would have eliminated the sunset clause. The pro posal 
contained arguments based on the protection of viewing opportunities. These proposals 
influenced the BOG to close an additional 183km2 to wolf hunting and trapping (Alaska Board of 
Game, 2002). 
 
2004 
 At the spring 2004 BOG meeting, the tide began to turn. Three Fish and Game Advisory 
Committees, and the Alaska Trappers Association submitted proposals in 2004 (Alaska Board of 
Game, 2004).  These four proposals sought elimination of the Buffer. The proposals argued 
elimination of the buffer would benefit ungulates and hunting opportunities. The BOG reduced 
the buffer to 316km2, the version seen in Figure 3.7. The BOG justified its decision by citing 
scientific studies. The results of the studies apparently showed the buffer had no measurable 
effects on the Denali wolf populations. The BOG continued to express willingness to “protect the 
viewing of wolves along a relatively small area the wolves routinely visit, while not trying to 
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protect their range” (Alaska Board of Game, 2004). The Board also set a six year moratorium on 
changes to the buffers to evaluate the effect on trappers and the tourism industry.  
 
3.2.3.3  CESSATION OF AGREEMENT 
 The previous moratorium on proposals to change the buffer ended at the spring 2010 BOG 
Interior Region meeting. Proposals were distinctly in favor of expanding the buffer, or in favor of 
its elimination (Alaska Board of Game, 2009).  
 
 The Denali Citizens Council, the Anchorage Fish and Game Advisory Committee, Defenders of 
Wildlife (submitted 2 proposals), and Superintendent of Denali, Philip Hooge all submitted 
proposals with the following themes: 
 Wolf numbers are declining in Denali. 
 Declining wolf numbers are bad for tourism. 
 Declining wolf numbers are bad for Denali’s ecosystem. 
 Alaskans value live wolves. 
 Non-Alaskans value live wolves. 
 BOG has an obligation under MMoU to cooperate with the NPS. 
 There are other places to trap wolves. 
 The number of people who benefit from the buffers (i.e. seeing wolves) far outweighs 
the small number of inconvenienced trappers who must trap elsewhere.  
 
 The Middle Nenana Advisory Council, Ray Heuer of the Fairbanks Fish and Game Advisory 
Committee (who submitted 2 proposals to eliminate the buffer and another two for predator 
control in the area); Mike Tinker, Chair of the Fairbanks Fish and Game Advisory Committee;  
and hunting guide Brent Keith’s proposals contained the following themes: 
 The wolf closures have no effect on wolf viewability. 
 The wolf buffers do not positively affect the local economy. 
 With the wolf buffers gone there would be more moose to hunt. 
 There are plenty of places where wolves are protected. 
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 When Hooge, presented a proposal to the BOG in spring of 2010, it was the first time the NPS 
had officially advocated for a buffer. Before this, proposals had always been put forth by private 
citizens, interest groups or ADFG. When discussing the difficulty of creating collaborative 
solutions, Hooge suggested that the “value of [State-federal] conflict has more value than 
wolves or tourism,” to the State (personal communication, April 2013). Hooge thought this 
value-in-conflict orientation to be especially true with the two most recent gubernatorial 
administrations (Sarah Palin and Sean Parnell) and discussed at length the changes in Federal-
State relations through various administrations. 
 
  All proposals for increasing the buffer were rejected unanimously by the Board. I transcribed 
vocal arguments from BOG members from a sound recording of the meeting (Audio for Unit 20 
Wolf Closure Proposals, February 26 - March 7, 2010). Selected excerpts from those 
transcriptions follow below. Reasons given by BOG members for rejecting buffer expansion were 
along political lines such as: 
 A boundary is a boundary; until a compromise comes from the other direction (i.e. the 
Department of the Interior) – a trade for something down the road such as predator 
control in other areas where we need it. 
 The Park Service is asking us to work together. We keep hearing what we need to do, 
but there is no budge from their side. 
 The Park should discontinue collaring wolves on the eastern boundary of the Park. 
They’re going to get trapped, if you’re going to study wolves, why not do it in the 
interior of the park? 
Legal jurisdictional lines such as: 
 There has been no measurable increase in wolf sightings since the buffer has been in 
place. Trapping information from before the buffer is unknown, but was low. There is no 
harm in the area remaining closed, but this is an allocation not biological issue.  
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 We need to provide reasonable opportunities for subsistence users. Trapping is a 
subsistence activity, and trapping areas are traditional. If we close this area, and say ‘do 
it elsewhere’, we’re forcing trappers to encroach on someone else’s area. 
Lines of relevance to tourism: 
 The number of wolves is insignificant. They’ll come back in a year or two. Tourists aren’t 
going to not come to Alaska because they might not see these wolves.  
 Photographers are at National Parks to photograph natural systems. No one wants a 
photograph of a wolf with a collar. 
 
 When proposals for removing the buffer were discussed, BOG comments were generally in 
favor of retaining the buffer. Comments compared the small sacrifice forced on a few trappers 
that had already adjusted, to the large and vocal constituency that had been more or less 
placated by the buffer present at that time. There was however some pushback against giving a 
proverbial inch to the ‘Feds’, and talk of how some people forgot that the “Feds swept in 25 
years [prior] and locked up millions of acres of land to manage for federal values” (Audio for 
Unit 20 Wolf Closure Proposals, February 26 - March 7, 2010). In the end, the BOG voted 4 to 3 
to eliminate the buffer, and placed a 6 year moratorium on related proposals. BOG rationale 
behind the moratorium was that the sheer amount of time spent on the subject when it comes 
up detracted from their ability to get other things done. 
 
 The Denali agreement ceased to exist, the same way it was created; the BOG regulated it out 
of existence. The BOG did not eliminate the buffer to prevent visitors to Denali from seeing 
wolves. The buffer was removed for a combination of scientific and political reasons. Regarding 
science, the BOG expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the buffer to achieve its stated 
objective. Regarding politics, as seen in the select comments above, the BOG expressed 
reticence to accommodate the NPS. This reticence on the BOG’s part is a reflection of the 
tension between state and federal wildlife management authority. The State is legally 
responsible for the management of wildlife in the entire state. This responsibility includes 
wildlife on federal lands (NPS lands included). The NPS has overridden and shown inflexibility to 
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the State when contradictory objectives come into play (e.g. Case Study 1). I believe it likely that 
official NPS involvement nudged the sovereignty issue over the threshold.  
 
3.2.3.4  INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
  The functionality of the agreement itself is best displayed with Figure 3.8. The figure relies 
on the Figure 3.1, but the agreement is added at its appropriate institutional level. 
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FIGURE 3.8: INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS IN DENALI AGREEMENT 
 
Arrows represent the main influences and direction of influence between the agreement and 
the institutions. The BOG is the main actor. The public and the ADFG submit proposals to the 
BOG. The BOG rejects, accepts, or amends, those proposals at it sees fit. BOG amendments can 
drastically alter original proposals. The BOG, influenced by the public and the ADFG, essentially 
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handed the agreement to the NPS. The buffer was clearly desirable to the NPS; however, they 
had no power to accept or reject it. ‘Agreement’ might in this case be the wrong word. In 2010, 
when the NPS officially submitted a proposal (i.e. asked for an agreement), it was rejected.  
 
 As seen in the selected, transcribed excerpts from the audio recording (above), in this case 
the BOG was leery of setting a precedent expanding NPS management objectives onto State 
land (with other management objectives). The NPS’s direct involvement introduced a new level 
of politics into the case. This level of politics seems to have contributed largely to the 
elimination of the buffer. Any minimal influence that the MMoU might have had to encourage 
cooperation was trumped by contemporary political conflict between the State and federal 
agencies.  
 
 A more inclusive representation of the dynamic relationships between entities involved can 
be seen in Figure 3.9.  
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FIGURE 3.9: ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS IN DENALI AGREEMENT 
 
The most active players in the Denali Wolf Buffer agreement are highlighted to stand out from 
the rest of the Entities Relationships diagram introduced at the beginning of the chapter. Here 
the most important actors were those that submitted proposals to the BOG: the public, NGOs, 
ADFG, Local Advisory Committees, and NPS. Similarly important was the BOG’s desire to play a 
political role reflecting the expectations of the administration that had appointed them as 
members of the BOG. The BOG must balance it political obligations with its obligations to the 
State Constitution, i.e., to regulate wildlife management for the benefit of all Alaskans. Finally, 
with the involvement of the NPS in the 2010 proposal process, the management priorities of 
Denali, a reflection of Congress’ guidance, were pursued. Once BOG lifted protection for wolves 
in the Wolf Townships, actions that could reduce wolf numbers was put in the hands of private 
trappers and hunters. When the moratorium is lifted, all actors will be permitted back to the 
table via the BOG proposal process.  
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3.2.3.5  DISCUSSION  
 This agreement involved protecting wolves from private hunters and trappers, as opposed to 
State wolf-control efforts. Nonetheless wolf-control played a central role in dialogue leading to 
the original creation of the buffer, and to its ultimate removal. Social pressure set the scene for 
the series for Denali Wolf Buffers. In the 1990s, as now, a significant number of Alaskans find 
pleasure in viewing wolves, and/ or do not like wolf-control. Negative media propelled Alaska’s 
wolf-control into the national spotlight. A wolf-control induced tourism boycott sent ripples 
beyond the US; even into Europe (A. Gandolfi, personal communication, April 2010) (Bruckner, 
1994). The financial impact of the boycott on Alaska’s tourism industry is impossible to gauge, 
but tourism is important for Alaska’s economy. A combination of social factors allowed a rare 
opportunity for an agreement to be made. The initial combination of factors quickly vanished, 
but their impact continues. Various interest groups participated in crafting a Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan. That plan led to the creation of the first buffer. The BOG rescinded the plan 
and buffer expeditiously, but the first buffer offered a template for future iterations.  
 
 In 2012 professor and activist, Rick Steiner submitted a proposal to remove the moratorium, 
arguing that it precluded the public from their right to participate in the regulatory process. The 
BOG unanimously rejected the proposal, reiterating the intent for the moratorium.  
 
 In response to BOG comments that evidence for impacts to wolves and tourism is lacking, a 
set of studies is being carried out by Denali staff. The studies aim to gauge: wolf movement in 
the area, the impacts of trapping on wolves, and public perceptions of wolf viewing (P. Hooge, 
personal communication, April 2013). 
 
  With certainty, once the moratorium is over the BOG will receive proposals to reinstate the 
buffer. Compelling science, social pressure, and political climate will likely guide BOG’s decision 
to adopt or deny (or amend) those proposals.  
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3.2.3.6  IMPLICATIONS 
 The impact of buffer elimination on wolf populations in a larger sense (i.e. throughout 
Denali, and Alaska) is nominal. The area is important to certain wolf packs and associated 
wildlife. Wolf populations in packs seen (or not seen) by Park Road visitors, appear to be 
declining (United States National Park Service, 2013). Current studies may illuminate the impacts 
on visitors and potential wolf viewers. NPS interpretation (e.g. rangers, media) will increase the 
visitors’ perception of what they are not seeing: (more) wolves, and (maybe) why. Tourists will 
incorporate these impressions into their thoughts on the issue. 
 
 In 2010, the BOG estimated a total of about 3-5 recreational trappers had regularly trapped 
in the Wolf Townships before the closure (Audio for Unit 20 Wolf Closure Proposals, February 26 
- March 7, 2010). These trappers are likely enjoying increased flexibility of trapping options. 
Multiple proposals indicated opening the buffer would (through trapping) decrease wolf 
numbers and increase prey availability for hunters. While a prey increase in absence of the 
buffer is possible, the impact on prey availability to hunters would be small. Residents of the 
immediate area might benefit. Between the minimal boost ungulates may receive, and the 
existent availability of much larger tracts of huntable land in the area, the influence of buffer 
elimination on hunters appears quite limited.  
 
  I would argue that the stakeholders most affected by the cessation of the agreement fail to 
be prominently addressed in the proposals and discussion. The BOG posited that for those in 
favor of wolf protection the buffer will never be big enough. Evidence for this position exists in 
proposals for ever-expanding buffers. Some people just want to protect wolves. The symbolism 
of the buffer removal may be more powerful than the quantification of wolves taken, or visitor 
trips without wolf sightings. Symbolism also affects those who simply disagree with limitations 
on wolf take. Further effects may be felt by an anti-federal constituency of Alaskans.   
 
3.3 WESTERN ALPS: ITALY & SWITZERLAND 
 Because of the distinct multi-level governance structure of the Western Alps case study, it 
was necessary to take a slightly different approach in analysis to what was used in the Alaska 
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case studies. Wherever possible, I maintained a sort of symmetry to facilitate an amenable 
comparison. 
 
3.3.1  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
 Figure 3.10 shows the main institutional levels affecting wolves in the Western Alps.  
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FIGURE 3.10: INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS AFFECTING WOLVES IN WESTERN ALPS: ITALY & SWITZERLAND5 
These are shown from the largest, or most all -encompassing at the top (i.e. UN), to the most 
local and directly relevant to wolves at the bottom (i.e. Cantons & Provinces). The institutional 
                                                             
5 Legal authority not necessarily implied. 
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levels do not necessarily imply top-down power; to the contrary, most ‘power’ in relevant wolf 
governance flows from the bottom of the diagram up. Nonetheless some institutions at ‘lower’ 
(but not necessarily less powerful) levels refer to and comply with ‘higher’ (but not necessarily 
more powerful) institutions.  
 
3.3.1.1  UNITED NATIONS 
 The UN is at the top of the Institutional Levels diagram. The UN includes  Italy, Switzerland 
and 191 other member states. While the US is one of those states, the US is not a party to the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) mentioned here. In a sense the UN belongs at the 
top of institution levels illustrations for the Alaska case studies. However, no current UN treaties 
affect wolf policy in Alaska; hence the UN is not mentioned in the Alaska case studies. Both the 
burgeoning Alpine Convention (discussed below), and the Trinational Agreement (the subject of 
this case study) both reference the CBD. Aspects of each stratigrafically higher institution 
frequently make appearances at lower institutional levels.  
 
3.3.1.2  COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 Italy and Switzerland are 2 of 47 member states of the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE is an 
international organization promoting cooperation between all the states of Europe in a number 
of topical fields, including wildlife and natural habitats (i.e. Bern Convention). The CoE is a 
separate entity from the EU, though cooperation between the entities has recently been 
reinforced. Two important distinctions between the CoE and the EU are 1) that the CoE cannot 
make enforceable laws, and 2) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can participate in and/ 
or observe many functions of the CoE.  
 
3.3.1.2.1  BERN CONVENTION 
 The Bern Convention was signed in 1979 and came into force in 1982.  As of 2010 the entire 
EU, CoE (except San Marino and Russia), and four African Nations are among the Bern 
Convention’s 50 contracting parties. The Bern Convention represents a large swath of 
conservation-treaty-bound land. The Bern Convention is likely the most influential law in Europe 
at the moment relating to wolf management (as well as other native European species and 
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habitats). Besides protecting species and habitats, another stated goal of the Bern Convention is 
to foster international cooperation in the field of natural resource conservation. 
 
 Species in the Bern Convention are listed under three Appendices. Appendix I is for strictly 
protected plants. Appendix II is for strictly protected animals (including the wolf). And Appendix 
III is for protected (i.e. not 'strictly' so) animals. Being listed as Appendix II or III is not a measure 
of how threatened or endangered a species is, rather, it is a result of consensus and 
negotiations.  
 
 All parties to the Bern Convention are committed to maintaining species populations at 
“levels that correspond to ecological, cultural and social requirements” (Bowman, Davies, & 
Ridgewell, 2010), despite the fact that these levels are intentionally undefined. Bowman, et al. 
also adds that meeting these goals overrides economic interests.  
 Relevant Prohibitions for Appendix II species are as follows: 
All forms of deliberate capture and keeping and deliberate killing:  
 The deliberate damage to or destruction of breeding or resting sites. 
 The deliberate disturbance of wild fauna, particularly during the period of breeding, 
rearing and hibernation, insofar as disturbance would be significant in relation to the 
objectives of the Bern Convention.  
 The possession of and internal trade in these animals, alive or dead, including stuffed 
animals and any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof, where this would 
contribute to the effectiveness of the provisions of this article.  
Protection afforded Appendix III species is decidedly more lax: 
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate and necessary legislative and administrative 
measures to ensure the protection of the wild fauna species specified in Appendix III.  
 Any exploitation of wild fauna specified in Appendix III shall be regulated in order to 
keep the populations out of danger, taking into account the requirements of Article 2.  
 Measures to be taken shall include:  
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o Closed seasons and/ or other procedures regulating the exploitation. 
o The temporary or local prohibition of exploitation, as appropriate, in order to 
restore satisfactory population levels. 
o The regulation as appropriate of sale, keeping for sale, transport for sale or 
offering for sale of live and dead wild animals.  
 
 Under certain circumstances, parties may exclude themselves from certain obligations given 
that it does not threaten the survival of a species, or population. Switzerland, for example has 
authorized the shooting of a number of disperser wolves entering from Italy (see discussion in 
1.2.2.1.2). At the request of livestock owners Switzerland has requested the transfer of wolves 
from Appendix II to Appendix III, these requests have been rejected by the Bern Convention 
Standing Committee because: 1) although the continental wolf population has increased in size 
through natural recolonization and legal protection, they maintain only a precarious hold in most 
regions, and 2) because other provisions to assist/ deal with livestock owners exist within the 
convention. 
 
 At the time of signing, parties are allowed to exempt themselves for particular species and 
methods of killing and capture otherwise prohibited (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
About half of the parties made one reservation or another, usually to the same few species 
commonly thought of as pests, or a danger to humans. The wolf occupies a prominent position 
on this list (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). Other exceptions are also authorized in certain 
situations, under careful examination, after the exhaustion of other options, such as the 
protection of flora and fauna, to prevent serious damage to livestock, research, and in the 
interest of public health (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
 
 Articles 4-9 deal with habitat conservation. Transboundary issues are addressed in Article 
4(3), which brings special attention to migration routes among Appendices II and III species. 4(4), 
requires parties to coordinate their habitats situated in ‘frontier areas’. The Bern Convention 
also contains guidelines for the introduction and reintroduction of species as well as the 
eradication of non-native species.  
84 
 
 The major mechanism for enforcement of the Bern Convention is a regularly meeting 
standing committee. The Standing Committee reviews parties' reports of general exceptions, 
national implementation, and other obligations. The Standing Committee also identifies problem 
locations. This process creates a kind of official peer pressure to comply with obligations, or risk 
criticism (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). Additionally, parties are obliged to pursue 
national policies, promote education and dissemination, and consider conservation in their 
development policies, though no details are provided (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010). 
 
3.3.1.3  EUROPEAN UNION 
 The EU is an economic and political union of 28 member states, including Italy, but not 
Switzerland. It operates through a system of supranational independent institutions and 
intergovernmental decisions negotiated by member states. 
 
 EU member states retain all powers not explicitly handed to the EU. There are international 
power-giving treaties which enable the EU to enact legislation binding for member states. The 
supremacy principle requires national courts to enforce treaties that EU member states have 
ratified, even superseding conflicting national law and some constitutional provisions. 
 
3.3.1.3.1  HABITATS INITIATIVE  
 The Habitats Directive (formerly Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora) is an EU directive adopted in 1992 mirroring the Bern 
Convention. Unlike the Bern Convention, the Habitats Directive has enforcement measures such 
as fines that can be exacted on member states for non-compliance. 
 
3.3.1.4  ALPINE CONVENTION 
 The Alpine Convention is a framework agreement encompassing Italy, Switzerland France, 
Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia, as well as the EU.  The Large Carnivores, 
Wild Ungulates and Society (WISO) platform deals with wolves, and ultimately supplants the 
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Trinational Agreement that is explored in depth here. The Alpine Convention in context is  
discussed in more detail in 3.3.5. 
 
3.3.1.5  NATIONAL LEVELS 
 Both Switzerland and Italy are sovereign nations and ultimately have the power to define 
their own wolf-management policies and practices. As mentioned above, these policies and 
practices are often influenced by transnational treaties and agreements. Nations are under 
extreme social pressure from other countries in the region to craft policies ‘in the spirit’ of these 
multi-lateral treaties and agreements (Bowman, Davies, & Ridgewell, 2010).  
 
 Switzerland, for example, has repeatedly been rebuked by other Bern Convention parties, for 
attempting to downgrade the wolf from Appendix II to Appendix III (i.e. offering less protection 
for the wolf). Whether this pressure would translate into other political arenas (e.g. trade policy) 
is speculative, but Switzerland has favored identifying ‘Spielraum’ (transl. Wiggle room) in 
treaties over outright disregard. Switzerland has also gone so far as to threaten to withdraw 
from the Bern Convention in order to re-sign with built-in reservations for wolf protection, but 
ultimately did not do so.  
 
 It can be argued that Switzerland with one of the strongest economies in Europe has a 
certain responsibility to minimize their complaints about hardships caused by wolves. This is 
also true, to a lesser extent, for Italy. This economic equity concept is complicated by such 
factors as tolerance for poaching and other informal institutions. It will be interesting to watch 
how wolf management policies reflect major economic realignments throughout the region.  
 
Because of this interplay between multi-level, multi-national entities I have chosen to discuss 
national-level policy in the context of functional relationships between entities.  Summaries of 
national level management strategies are located below within the context of the Trinational 
Agreement. 
 
 
86 
3.3.1.6  ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS IN ITALIAN - SWISS WOLF POLICY 
As seen in Figure 3.11, the Bern Convention applies to the member states of the CoE (i.e. 
both Switzerland and Italy). 
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FIGURE 3.11: ENTITY RELATIONSHIP S IN ITALIAN - SWISS WOLF POLICY 
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Both countries have input to the CoE on a federal level. CoE treaties such as the Bern 
Convention are binding, but in reality are only enforceable though a peer-pressure mechanism. 
Peer pressure to respect the spirit of the agreements exhibits some level of success. The Bern 
Convention Secretariat is responsible for communication to member states on policy 
compliance. In the case of Italy, a member of the EU, Bern Convention obligations were 
mirrored and strengthened when the EU adopted the Habitats Directive which is legally binding 
to EU states under penalty of fine.  
 
 The European Commission (EC), under the EU requested that the Large Carnivore Initiative 
for Europe (LCIE), under the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Special 
Species Commission (SSC) develop Guidelines for Population Level Management Plans for Large 
Carnivores (Guidelines). Interest groups are also able to contribute to the LCIE. The LCIE worked 
with the Italian Ministry of the Environment, interpreting the Habitats Directive and ultimately 
endorsing the Action Plan for the Conservation of the Wolf in the Italian Alps (Italian Action 
Plan).  
 
 The Italian Action Plan, though not legally binding, serves rather as guidelines for the 
application of the Italian law DPR 357/97. DPR 357/97 implements the Habitats Directive in 
national law, and National Legislation 157 on Wildlife Conservation. These laws were put into 
place by federal, elected officials, who also appoint the Ministry of the Environment. The Italian 
Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) is responsible for providing 
research and technical support, on how to implement wolf policy, to the Ministry of the 
Environment. The Ministry of the Environment technically could choose not to accept the 
recommendations; in reality however, the Ministry authorizes all actions based on ISPRA 
recommendations. Policy is then handed down to the Provinces and Regions. Provinces and 
Regions would theoretically be responsible for wolf culling if it were to be approved (it has not 
as of yet).  
 
 Provinces and Regions pay compensation for livestock lost to wolves as well as subsidizing 
protection measures. Livestock breeders can influence policy only indirectly by supporting 
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interest groups which represent them and can provide input to the LCIE and the CoE. Livestock 
breeders are also part of the larger body of concerned public that through strength in numbers 
and/ or the media may or may not sway elected officials. Elected officials have their hands tied 
relatively tightly by layers of bureaucracy, and have very little wiggle room to concede.  
  
In Switzerland as well, the Bern Convention Secretariat communicates back with the 
appointed Federal Office for Environment (FOEN) about compliance with Bern Convention 
obligations. Switzerland has also adopted the Guidelines. The Guidelines enter the policy-
making mix through FOEN to a working group including cantonal entities, scientists from 
Carnivore Ecology and Wildlife Management (KORA), and various interest groups. The Federal 
Hunting Law and clarifying bylaw are further taken into account, and FOEN enacts versions of 
the legally binding Concept Wolf. Concept Wolf lays out policies for cantons regarding wolf-
control, livestock protection, and compensation for loss.  
 
There is also an unofficial group, the ‘4G’. ‘4G’ is a double entendre referring at once to the 
‘vier Grosse’ – or big 4 interest groups including: a hunters organization, a shepherds 
organization, WWF, and ProNatura (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, May 2013); and 
to the controversial article 4G in the bylaw that deals with ‘population regulation’. These four 
groups try to hash out their differences behind closed doors, and are a good indicator of the 
bent of the most controversial groups.  
 
Swiss interest groups, like Italian interest groups represent specific interests as opposed to 
the public as a whole. As in Italy, Swiss interest groups have access to the CoE/ Bern Convention, 
and the LCIE. Unlike Italian interest groups, Swiss interest groups have a say in their national 
policy process. This makes Swiss interest groups arguably more influential than Italian ones. The 
Swiss federal government, less encumbered in the absence of EU regulation is more susceptible 
to social pressure from the concerned public and media outlets.  
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As in the entity-relationship, conceptual diagrams above, Figure 3.11 shows each of the main 
actors and their main direction of influence, in the context of wolf governance. Some 
information is intentionally redundant with Figure 3.10. 
 
3.3.2  AGREEMENT 3 – TRINATIONAL COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT 
 The Trinational Collaborative Agreement between Italy, Switzerland, and France was the 
result of a recommendation by the Bern Convention Standing Committee. In 2004 Switzerland 
attempted to have the wolf downgraded from Appendix II to Appendix III protection within the 
Convention, in order to allow more flexibility in management (e.g. removal). At the same time 
the EU (including Italy and France), also a Bern Convention party, had accepted a 
recommendation to conduct a scientific study on the size and distribution of the European wolf 
population and threats to it. It had become clear that 1) those three nations played a 
particularly important role in the conservation of the wolf population originating in Italy, and 2) 
each nation had interpreted their Bern Convention obligations vis-à-vis wolves into 
management policies somewhat incompatible with the others. Each country’s wolf management 
policies are and have been in flux since the wolf ‘issue’ became an important one. In brief, 
recent wolf-management policies, reflecting national predispositions and interpretations of 
identical treaty obligations of Italy, Switzerland and France are summarized below.  
 
3.3.2.1  ITALY 
 In Italy, wolves are strictly protected. There have been no exceptions allowing removal, 
though exceptions are theoretically possible. Despite protection under the law, the informal 
institution of poaching is responsible for the killing of an estimated 15, 20, or even 30% of the 
wolf population annually (P. Genovesi, personal communication, May, 2013). Luigi Boitani, a 
prominent wolf biologist and contributor to documents such as the Italian Action Plan, is quoted 
as saying “There is a type of illegal compromise.” In Italy wolf-poachers are rarely if ever 
pursued or prosecuted. As mentioned above, the Italian Action Plan itself is not a management 
plan and is not legally binding, but provides guidelines and technical support for policy makers. 
Policy makers have expressed unhappiness with the level of poaching, but feel unable to stop it  
(E. Dupré, personal communication, April 2013). According to Eugenio Dupré, from the Italian 
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Ministry for the Environment, the thinking is that allowing any legal removal will not prevent 
poaching, but rather add to the overall number of wolves removed (personal communications, 
April 2013). 
 
 This ‘illegal compromise’ faces various levels of success across various provinces for two 
primary reasons. First, the regions where wolves were never extirpated are acclimated to 
predators, and have continued to practice shepherding methods which minimize predation on 
herds (Genovesi, 2002). Between protective measures, and the occasional shoot-shovel-shut-up 
treatment of problem wolves, there is minimal conflict over wolves (E. Dupré, personal 
communication, May 2013). In regions, on the other hand, where wolves have only recently 
returned, laissez faire shepherding is often the status quo. Shepherds here are for various 
practical and cultural reasons slow to adopt protection methods, and poach high numbers of 
wolves (Genovesi, 2002).  
 
 Secondly, the strategy for building local support is to reimburse shepherds for each animal 
lost to wolves. To build goodwill and minimize disagreement between livestock herders and 
officials, reimbursement requirements preclude examining the kill too closely to determine 
whether it was in fact a wolf kill (E. Dupré, personal communication, May 2013). Avoiding 
extreme scrutiny is intended to relieve some of the burden felt by livestock herders due to the 
sanctioned wolf recolonization (E. Dupré, personal communication, May 2013).  Evidence shows 
that the number of sheep killed by domestic dogs is greater, than by wolves. Annual 
reimbursements total upwards of €1.5 million per year (Boitani, Ciucci, & Raganella-Pelliccioni, 
2010). Provinces are responsible for reimbursements on their own, and processes and pay-outs 
vary significantly from region to region leading to incoherence even within Italy.  
 
3.3.2.2  SWITZERLAND 
 Switzerland’s national management plan is Concept Wolf. As of fall 2013, Concept Wolf is 
currently being revised. The stated priority for the plan is to minimize problems between 
humans and their activities (e.g. agriculture, hunting, tourism), and the presence of wolves. Like 
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Italy, Switzerland reimburses farmers for their losses. There are however, some notable 
differences.  
 
 First, costs are split between the Swiss Federal Government and cantonal governments. Since 
farmers are presumably anxious for reimbursement, this shared federal - regional arrangement 
ensures support for the cantons, and ensures that the cantons act appropriately (i.e. since they 
too are paying). Farmers must retain the livestock carcass to prove wolf predation was 
responsible. If an examination is inconclusive (e.g. a dog might have killed the sheep), partial 
reimbursement can be distributed. Further there is a series of phases where protection 
measures are subsidized once wolves have been identified in a region. These subsidies are 
gradually reduced over time. This reduction is based on the initial investment having already 
been made (e.g. to purchase and/ or train a guard dog), and as herd protection becomes 
standard operation procedure. A farmer must have taken mandatory protective measures to be 
eligible for compensation.  
 
 The first year that wolves are identified as being in a region, if 25 livestock are killed in a 
month, or 35 in four months, and mandatory protective measures have been taken, a permit is 
issued to remove the problem wolf. In the second year, only 15 livestock have to be lost to 
predation for a permit to be issued, assuming all mandatory protective measures have been 
taken. For a frame of reference, between 1995 and 2008, 32 wolves had been confirmed in the 
country, of those, 8 were removed legally. Of course identifying the ‘problem’ wolf  to remove is 
problematic. It appears that DNA confirmation only takes place after the suspected wolf is shot. 
Switzerland has very little poaching of wolves (C. Nienhuis, personal communication, April 
2013). 
 
3.3.2.3  FRANCE6 
 As mentioned previously, both Italy and France share the enforceable EU Habitats Directive 
as a guiding rule. Comparing wolf-management relationship between Switzerland and Italy, and 
                                                             
6 See discussion in Chapter 1. 
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Italy and France reveals some significant differences. Between Italy and France, there is more 
frequent communication, stricter collaboration and control, and generally fewer practical 
differences between the two countries when it comes to wolf management. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, because of this preexisting coherence and for matters of simplicity, I have chosen to 
focus on the Italian - Swiss border; however, the formal contrast between Italy and France is 
important for context. 
 
 The wolf population is well into the hundreds in France (Sayare, 2013). In 2009 alone, an 
estimated 3,279 livestock (primarily sheep) were killed by wolves, and €3 million are spent 
annually on herd protection (Baumgarnter, Gloor, & Weber, 2011). The National Wolf Action 
Plan in the French Context of Substantial and Traditional Livestock Farming puts as strong an 
emphasis on conditions for small livestock farming, as on wolf conservation. The plan states that 
the costs for herd protection and livestock compensation are impossibly high. Therefor the plan 
seeks to bound the areas where wolves recolonize, and slow wolves’ expansion. This is done by 
liberally issuing wolf removal permits, in order to buy time to build acceptance among locals and 
prepare protection measures. Shepherds with hunting licenses may shoot wolves molesting 
their herds. Various numbers of wolf removal permits have been issued per year. Although exact 
quantities are difficult to come by, approximately 100 wolves were poached between 2000 and 
2008 (Baumgarnter, Gloor, & Weber, 2011).  
 
3.3.3  AGREEMENT CONTINUED 
 The most important part of the Trinational Agreement was the clear recognition that Italy, 
Switzerland, and France were dealing with a single wolf population (E. Dupré, personal 
communication, April 2013). The existence of a single Italian-French-Swiss wolf population had 
not been a matter of debate among experts studying the topic (U. Breitenmoser, personal 
communication, June 2013). The evidence was also “too clear” to be questioned by the agencies 
in charge (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, June 2013). Negotiations between Italian, 
French, and Swiss environmental ministers’ delegates, completely outside of the Bern 
Convention institutions, resulted in the official recognition of a single Italian-French-Swiss wolf 
population (P. Genovesi, personal communication, June 2013).  
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 That no country should and/ or could do meaningful management without consultation with 
neighboring countries has also been considered common understanding among experts and 
agencies in charge (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, June 2013). Despite independent 
management entities, there was a need to find agreements. The Trinational Agreement 
references the Bern Convention, the Habitats Initiative, and the CBD. The agreement focuses on 
the shared responsibility and ecological value in supporting wolf conservation, the importance 
of shared research, and the need to maintain alpine livestock farming. The agreement also 
recognized that each national management or action plan called for international contact and 
coordination. More specifically, I was told that the exchange of management experience was 
paramount, and that there were several working groups focused on: damage prevention, 
damage response, human consensus (i.e. popular opinion and public awareness).  
 
In the Trinational Agreement, which was not legally binding, environmental ministers from 
Italy, Switzerland, and France committed to: 
 meeting regularly to: 
o Strengthen the coordination of wolf policies and information exchange. 
o Create a technical working group for wolf research and monitoring to support 
the natural recolonization.  
o Designate a contact for each country responsible for wolf communication. 
 Make technical and administrative information available. 
 Exchange personnel to assist with research. 
 Work together to create conservation/  preservation programs for border areas. 
 Inform bordering countries about any plans to conduct wolf-control, and to inform 
bordering countries about reasons for the wolf-control. 
 
 On the Institutional Levels Affecting Wolves in Italy and Switzerland diagram (Figure 3.12), 
the Trinational Agreement fits between the Alpine Convention and the national levels.  
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FIGURE 3.12: INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS AFFECTING WOLVES IN WESTERN ALPS AGREEMENT 
 
Arrows from the CoE Bern Convention, the EU Habitats Directive, and national levels have all 
been displayed as the same size, though the reasons are different. As mentioned above, the 
CoE’s Bern Convention Standing Committee originally recommended the three countries craft 
an agreement. Though the EU Habitats Directive did not, per se, call for the creation of the 
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agreement, the agreement would assist EU countries in meeting their Habitats Directive 
responsibilities. The Habitats Directive was cited numerous times in the Trinational Agreement. 
As implied above, the Trinational Agreement was in part conceived as a way to correlate the 
Habitats Directive and Swiss wolf management policies. Finally, each country had a say in the 
contents of the agreement, and the environment ministers from each country signed it.  
 
3.3.4  CESSATION OF AGREEMENT FUNCTIONALITY 
 There was never an official decision to stop meetings sanctioned by the agreement; 
however, they ceased around 2010. This cessation corresponded roughly with the inception of 
the WISO platform, set up in 2009 under the Alpine Convention. Discussed in more detail below, 
this platform makes the Trinational Agreement redundant. Some participants in transboundary 
wolf conversations indicate with candor that the WISO platform simply replaced the Trinational 
Agreement making it irrelevant (C. Nienhuis, personal communication, April 2013); others found 
the unofficial cessation of the meetings “unfortunate” (E. Dupré, personal communication, April 
2013). The official line for not meeting was that participants “forgot”, but there were some 
conflicting undercurrents between participants such as the “difficulties of Switzerland to accept 
the main rule [which was] formally agreed upon…” (E. Dupré, personal communication, April 
2013). The WISO platform offers more options to affect management guidelines, and 
development options than the Trinational Agreement does.  
 
 When pressed about the cessation of the Trinational Agreement, all interviewees shared 
similar opinions. Although there were some “different ways to see the situation,” between 
parties, the real conflict was between livestock farmers and environmental NGOs (E. Dupré, 
personal communication, April 2013). These conflicts, which roughly translate into the rural - 
urban divide, were the same on both sides of the border. Though interviewees maintained that 
the dissonance was not between countries, rather between stakeholder groups, certain 
contentious issues were evident.  
 In the context of an increasing wolf population in Italy, France would have preferred 
Italy reduce those border populations in Italy that have a large impact in France. 
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 No official statement appeared pointing the finger at Switzerland. Key wolf biologists 
and vocal advocates, however, were concerned. As shown in Figure 3.13, the convex 
border of the Swiss canton Ticino, extends south far into Italian urban sprawl.  
 
FIGURE 3.13: SWISS TICINO & ITALY DETAIL MAP 
 
The capability of even adaptable wolves to traverse such dense human development 
seemed unlikely to the participants. A combination of the already limited number of 
wolves in Switzerland, and liberal permitting for wolf removal could act as a barrier 
(personal communication, A. Gandolfi, April 2011). The barrier could prevent the wolf 
population of Italian stock from connecting with Eastern European wolves (especially 
Slovenian wolves). Interbreeding between these two populations would be positive for 
genetic biodiversity of the population(s). This concern was partially alleviated in 2012, 
when the first Slovenian female wolf reached and spent significant time with a male 
wolf from France. It appears this meeting occurred without the wolf entering 
Switzerland (E. Dupré, personal communication, April 2013). Despite the wolves’ 
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success, this situation highlights the impacts of contradictory management transcending 
borders. It also highlights a potential source of disagreement between Italian and Swiss 
officials. 
 
The difference between policies on legal removal and tolerance of poaching 
represents a distinct difference between Italian and Swiss wolf management. From the 
Italian point of view, Switzerland’s permitting of removal can be seen as too liberal and 
not in the spirit of the treaties and agreements. On the other hand, from Switzerland’s 
point of view, controlled legal wolf removal and very little poaching is preferable to 
tolerating rampant poaching under the guise of full legal protection. 
 
3.3.5  ALPINE CONVENTION & DISCUSSION 
 The Alpine Convention came into force in 1995, and spans not only the trinational region, but 
the entire alpine region including Italy, Switzerland, France, Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, and Slovenia, and includes the EU. The WISO platform, like its predecessor in function 
(the Trinational Agreement) is not binding by law. The WISO platform does have buy-in and 
direct access to environmental ministers from the entire region with ministerial meetings every 
two years. WISO has had a slow start, but takes a much more holistic approach to wolf and 
wildlife interactions with human society than the Trinational Agreement. Projects under the 
Alpine Convention are “aimed at promoting sustainable development in the Alpine area and at 
protecting the interests of the people living within it. It embraces the environmental, social, 
economic and cultural dimensions” (Alpine Convention, n/d).  
 
 WISO is also one of the partners in the nascent Recovery of Wolf and Lynx in the Alps 
(RowAlps) project. The main objectives of RowAlps are: to model potential distribution of wolf 
and lynx, to detect public tolerance mechanisms, and to develop management options.  So, while 
the Trinational Agreement has ceased to be effective, it has been succeeded by something that 
is likely to not only take its place, but which is also likely to be more effective than its 
predecessor. It has been suggested that the most important function of the Trinational 
Agreement was to identify Italy, Switzerland, and France’s wolves as a single population. These 
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new approaches under development recognize an even larger, pan-Alp population. Beyond that, 
they recognize indivisibility between wolves and socio-ecological systems. 
 
3.3.6  IMPLICATIONS 
 It is important to note that interest groups generally against wolf recolonization see inherent 
conflict because only a very limited amount of habitat is not being used for residential, 
agricultural or tourism-related applications (M. Schwery, personal communication, April 2013). 
Further protecting sheep and goat herds in alpine landscapes implies increased overhead and 
decreased (already minimal) profits, and it may even be a  practical impossibility (M. Schwery, 
personal communication, April 2013). Despite this, the clear majority of both Swiss and Italians 
polled are in favor of wolf recolonization (Boutros, 2003).  
 
 The general populace seems to be mostly ambivalent about the entire large carnivore 
(including wolf) situation (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, May 2013). The overall 
attitude trends towards large carnivores (including wolves) could be swayed in favor of or 
against large carnivores by media sensationalism (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, 
May 2013). As discussed in Chapter 1, although the actual danger to humans that wolves pose is 
very small, it is almost inevitable that at some point a negative wolf – human interaction will 
occur. Such low-frequency, high-impact events may shift public attitudes against wolves.  
 
 Assuming a continued positive attitude trend among humans towards wolves, Alaska-esque 
questions may arise as to what desirable wolf population numbers might look like. Reducing 
wolf populations to desired numbers, effectively in a socially acceptable way will present a 
further challenge. As has been seen in some parts of the US, once the public has been 
acclimated to viewing the wolf as protected, it can be politically difficult to lessen protection. 
Trends point to an increasing wolf population expanding its range in the Alps. If this potential is 
realized, important ecological and cultural consequences will likely follow. 
 
 Centuries of intense Alpine forest use and livestock presence, as well as decades of 
recovering prey species have led to a significant lack of forest biodiversity in forests of this 
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region (McShane & McShane-Caluzi, 1998). Studies such as those of wolf reintroduction into 
Yellowstone National Park, point to the potential of restored wolf populations to reduce 
browsing damage, to influence restored forest biodiversity, and to lead to cleaner water, and 
other positive externalities. Increasing forest biodiversity not only fulfills legal and treaty 
obligations, but may also reduce forest vulnerability to catastrophic weather events such as 
1999’s hurricane Lothar, which caused 1,780 million CHF of damage to forests and proximal 
human infrastructure (Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, 1999).   
 
 The ability of planning and approaches to mediate the effects of wolf recolonization on 
regional culture remains to be seen. There are three main factors at play: First, the most 
vulnerable type of livestock production to predation, sheep, faces important questions of 
economic sustainability of the practice. Second, shepherding is an important component of local 
cultural identities. Shepherding is also important to national identities. Just the knowledge that 
the shepherding is taking place in the Alps is valued and a link to a shared cultural heritage. This 
is part of cultivating the Kulturlandschaft (translation: culture-landscape) many are fond of. 
Third, although there is no subsistence hunting to speak of, hunting is a very important tradition 
to particular groups. Hunting interest groups have continued to maintain a counter-
recolonization stance in the policy-making process (U. Breitenmoser, personal communication, 
May 2013), though publicly they express openness. These factors were prominent in the original 
downfall of wolves in the region, and some traditional practices will require significant 
adaptation to survive the wolf’s return.  
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
4.1  DISCUSSION 
 The three cases explored in this study occur in notably different socio-ecological contexts. 
They represent three very different ways of attempting to govern wolves in transboundary 
regions. Interestingly, the two agreements between the NPS and State of Alaska were as 
dissimilar from each other as either was from the Western Alps agreement. I conducted 
institutional research, and communicated directly with many of the elite actors involved in the 
agreements proper, and their larger contexts. For each case study, I utilized that information to 
analyze the institutional and larger socio-ecological context. I analyzed the inception, execution, 
and cessation of functionality in each agreement. Finally, I analyzed the impacts of the 
agreements and their cessation, on wolves, associated ecosystems, and human stakeholders. 
 
4.1.1  LIMITATIONS 
 Three main limitations to my research should be noted. First, communication with some 
apparent, main actors in the agreements and the larger context of the agreements proved 
impossible and/ or impractical. Access to some higher level decision-makers, for example was 
elusive. In other cases, the number of important actors was so great that a sampling approach 
had to suffice. The second limitation was the intermittent unavailability of actors for checking 
and rechecking the accuracy of details as new information came to light. Finally, the evolving 
nature of the socio-ecological contexts imposed the third main limitation. The evolving nature of 
empirical facts, and the passage of time, may influence the memory of interviewees. This is 
especially true for actors still grappling with the complexities of wolf management, reflecting 
back on the way things were. 
 
4.1.2  COMMONALITIES   
  Three distinct commonalities between cases emerged. First all three cases deal explicitly 
with the governance of transboundary wolves. Second, each case represents an attempt at 
coherence between management entities of separate, adjacent jurisdictions. In each case, each 
entity has differing wolf-related management approaches and priorities. Finally each case 
focuses on an agreement which ultimately ceases to function.   
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4.1.3  DISPARITIES 
 Disparities are more prevalent than commonalities between cases. The following summarizes 
and juxtaposes primary points of comparison. 
 
4.1.3.1  DIFFERING ENDS 
 To begin with, each agreement existed for very different reasons. The Yukon-Charley 
agreement existed for two reasons. It existed from the NPS point of view to protect Yukon-
Charley wolves. The end desired by the NPS was continuous protection of Preserve wolves from 
Alaska’s wolf-control efforts. ADFG saw the agreement as a means to get along with the NPS. 
Getting along could build public goodwill towards ADFG. The agreement also could have helped 
avoid negative consequences of conflict with the NPS, and may have achieved tacit approval of 
predator control by the NPS. 
 
 Proponents saw the Denali Wolf Buffer as a means to provide sustained opportunities for 
visitors to Denali to see wolves. The BOG saw the buffer as a means to placate wolf advocates. 
The BOG also saw the buffer as at least a symbolic fulfillment of its Alaska Constitutional 
objective of regulating resources allocation for the maximum benefit of all Alaskans.  
 
 One could say that the ends Italy, Switzerland, and France sought in signing the Trinational 
Agreement was the fulfillment of an obligation. This might be true at the level of the ministers 
who signed the agreement. Despite the agreement’s stated objectives, the nations’ 
management plans remained incongruent. Managers and scientists who I interviewed saw the 
agreement as a necessary recognition of a shared wolf population, and an opportunity to share 
expertise and experiences.  
 
4.1.3.2  DIFFERING CONCEPTION 
 The conception of the three agreements also varies. The most noticeable differences involve 
inception and institutional levels. In Yukon-Charley, the agreement was made between two 
high-level managers. David James was trying to stretch both ADFG and NPS mandates to reach 
his objectives. Greg Dudgeon was originally surprised at the offer, which he accepted. The larger 
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institutional processes were not involved in the process. The agreement was handed down as a 
way of doing business that was mandated elsewhere.  
  
Proposals from the public, NGOs, and agencies initiated the Denali agreement. The BOG 
brought the agreement into existence on its own regulatory authority. 
 
 In the Western Alps, the sudden reappearance of wolves triggered preexisting conservation 
treaties. Wolves and treaty obligations triggered the creation of national-level policies. 
Incoherence between national-level policies triggered top down, International peer pressure. 
Peer pressure served as an impetus for the creation of the Trinational Wolf Agreement.  
 
4.1.3.3  DIFFERING FUNCTIONALITY 
 The functionality of each agreement was different. In Yukon-Charley, ADFG agreed not to 
shoot NPS radio-collared wolves. The NPS provided information to enable the identification of 
these wolves. The agreement was in no way legally binding. It did meet its explicit objectives 
temporarily, but failed in the long run. 
 
 By regulating the Denali Wolf Buffer into existence, the BOG handed management to the 
ADFG. The ADFG was responsible for publishing the closure. The agreement was legally binding 
until it was rescinded. The ADFG would be responsible for wildlife troopers to enforce the 
closure. Although the agreement worked in the sense that wolves presumably were not 
harvested in the buffer zone, changes in the probability of viewing buffer zone wolves by Denali 
visitors before, during and after the buffer is unclear.  
 
 The Western Alps agreement worked simply by requiring regular meetings between 
managers to discuss management directions, requiring the creation of technical groups, and 
requiring one country inform the other before management actions on wolves were taken. This 
agreement was not legally binding, and was only negligibly successful. In the long run, the goals 
of the Trinational Agreement are being met, but through another avenue.  
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4.1.3.4  CESSATIONS  
 As mentioned above, cessation of functionality is one common thread between the 
agreements. Cessation of functionality, like most aspects of the agreements came about 
differently. The agreement between Yukon-Charley, and the ADFG ceased to function because 
of a communication break-down, contradictory mandates, and a lack of formal structure. A 
mistake precipitated the original disruption of the agreement. The lack of formal agreement to 
refer to, or formal structure to fall back on exacerbated the inherent tension of working 
between contradictory mandates. Finally, the NPS found the agreement ADFG could offer 
insufficient. The limited amount of wolf protection was insufficient for a collateral acceptance by 
the NPS of a predator control effort. 
 
 The Denali agreement ceased to exist, the same way it was created. BOG regulated it out of 
existence. The BOG did not eliminate the buffer to prevent visitors to Denali from seeing wolves. 
The buffer was removed for a combination of scientific and political reasons. Regarding science, 
the BOG expressed doubt about that the buffer effectively achieved its stated objective (i.e. 
increasing wolf viewing opportunities). Regarding politics, before the NPS became officially 
involved, the buffer was an agreement between the public and the State. Once the NPS joined 
the process, proposing buffer expansions, the BOG saw a federal agency asking the state to 
manage state lands adjacent to NPS lands in a certain way. This official NPS involvement seems 
to have nudged the sovereignty issue over a threshold, leading to the lifting of the buffer. 
 
 The Alpine Convention replaced the Trinational Wolf Agreement. Switzerland found the new 
platform more amenable than the old, and jumped at the opportunity. Italian officials agreed 
that the agreements were more-or-less the same. Italian officials none-the-less lamented, at 
least, the unofficial cessation of meetings stipulated by the Trinational Agreement. Contacts in 
both countries agree that the new platform is more holistic.  
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4.1.3.5  IMPACTS 
 With respect to transboundary wolf management, one of the most important overarching 
questions is the actual impacts of the agreements to socio-ecological systems, compared to the 
systems in the absence of the agreements.  
 
4.1.3.5.1 WOLVES & ECOSYSTEMS 
 The impact the agreement’s cessation on Yukon-Charley’s wolves is negative, at least in the 
short term. Following the cessation of the agreement, David James reported the most successful 
year ever for wolf-control in the Fortymile region. The long-term prognosis for wolves in the 
region of Yukon-Charley is unanswerable without more knowledge about the future of wolf-
control, and management of the Fortymile caribou herd. The agreement itself did not affect 
many wolves on a landscape or ecosystem scale. But continued wolf-control over the larger 
region in perpetuity might cause undesirable, landscape scale, ecosystem changes. The 
minimum 20% of wolves that must remain after a wolf-control effort, in addition to present 
landscape connectivity will probably avoid catastrophic impacts to the regional ecosystem. This 
Landscape connectivity includes Yukon, Canada, where lethal wolf-control efforts are banned 
(Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board, 2012). A further failsafe begins with the nutritional 
analyses of caribou. Caribou are regularly tested. The idea is that if caribou display signs of 
insufficient nutrition, their habitat is at the upper end of caribou carrying capacity. If testing 
shows insufficient nutrition predator control will theoretically be reduced or halted. Reducing or 
stopping predator control would allow predation to prevent caribou from over-browsing their 
habitat and causing excessive ecological harm. If caribou and wolf population estimates are 
accurate, and management actions adapt to new information, the potential impacts of selective 
wolf-control should be minimized.  
 
 In the Denali region’s Wolf Townships, similarly to the Yukon-Charley case, wolf predation on 
ungulates may decline. Trappers did not intensely trap wolves before the Denali Wolf Buffer was 
created, but NPS studies do show a decline in wolves since the buffer was removed. To what 
extent wolf hunting and/ or trapping in the Wolf Townships is responsible for the decline is, as 
yet uncertain. The Wolf Townships represent a small area adjacent to a large, protected area. 
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The impact of the agreement and the agreement’s cessation on the Park’s ecosystem is likely to 
only have effects on a local scale. 
 
 The only agreement that seems to have unfolded in favor of the wolves about which the 
agreement was written is the Western Alps agreement. Although the agreement itself did not 
succeed, wolf populations across the region are increasing. The presence of the wolf now seems 
to be permanent. Of the three case studies, the Western Alps ecosystems face the most drastic 
ecological impacts from recolonizing wolves, and wolf management policies. The main question 
regarding the potential of wolves to positively affect the Western Alps ecosystem is whether the 
number of wolves needed to cause these changes can be socially tolerated.  
 
4.1.3.5.2  STAKEHOLDERS 
 Driving all policies and agreements are human values. Stakeholders are engaged in the fate 
of the wolf either because they perceive themselves to be positively or negatively affected. 
  
 Local stakeholders in and around Yukon-Charley are likely to benefit from the dissolution of 
the agreement. They may have increased hunting opportunities, and sometimes have anti-
federal attitudes. Unlike Denali, Yukon-Charley is little known, especially nationally and 
internationally. The wolf-control issues are therefore less salient to the larger (e.g. national) 
camps for and against wolf-control, suggesting that at least for a time the local pro wolf-control 
constituency may be able to benefit from their preferred management regime. 
 
 Proponents of the Denali Wolf Buffer are incensed by the removal of the buffer, and will 
almost certainly rally a significant effort to address the BOG when the moratorium is lifted. 
Whether tourists will avoid visiting Alaska or Denali because of reduced viewing opportunities is 
unclear. It appears many Americans maintain a high existence value for Denali wolves. The 
removal of the buffer certainly does not improve the State of Alaska’s image for these 
stakeholders. Denali’s visitor information highlighting the wolf situation has the potential to 
further damage the State’s image. The removal of the buffer was certainly gratifying to its 
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opponents. However, the number of stakeholders who will functionally benefit from the now 
open Wolf Townships is very small. 
 
 In the Western Alps, the Trinational Agreement was and is largely unknown to the public. It 
also had very little direct impact on actual transboundary wolf management. The impact, 
however, of recognizing a shared population has already had important ramifications. The 
Alpine Convention, WISO platform has more political buy-in than the Trinational agreement. The 
Alpine Convention has a robust education and outreach component.  
 
 Wolf recolonization is dynamic and uncertain, but the trend favors an increasing wolf 
population. All stakeholders stand to gain from increased ecosystem services from increased 
biodiversity as a result of wolf (and other large carnivore) recolonization. The direct impacts to 
these stakeholders by an increase in wolves (and other large carnivores) sufficient to bring 
about these ecological changes is unknown. Continued successful recolonization will certainly 
make the economics of small-scale, small animal husbandry more challenging. Changes to 
traditional land uses will impact cultural identity at multiple scales. Wolves’ adaptability and 
behavior may alter present broad support and tolerance by humans. How many wolves there 
will be, where they will live (e.g. rural, sub-urban, urban), and what they will eat (e.g. wildlife, 
domestic livestock, pets), will all play into the yet to unfold question of impacts to stakeholders. 
4.2  CONCLUSION 
 Over 100 years ago, large carnivores were almost completely extirpated from the Western 
Alps. Based on the needs and worldview of the protagonists, this was perfectly rational at the 
time. We now know that removing top predators from a system can cause massive ecological 
changes (Stolzenberg, 2008), that negatively impact ecosystem services and other human 
values. It would be arrogant for us to think that any management strategy pursued today is 
objectively correct. I believe that variability of management approaches across a landscape 
increases adaptive capacity. If we make a mistake on a small scale (e.g. one management unit) 
negative consequences are limited. If on the other hand, we make a collaborative mistake on a 
huge scale, correspondingly huge consequences are probable. If historic Alpine Arc wolf 
management had consistently been successful, there would have been no remnant population 
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to recolonize the region now. That being said, coordinated management (e.g. information, 
capacity) is imperative to sound resource management, especially regarding transboundary 
natural resources (see 1.2.1). This is increasingly true based on the transboundary, regional, 
continental, and global importance of the resource.  
 
 People recognize the importance of transboundary coordination. Generally effective 
transboundary agreements can be found for anadromous fish, caribou herds, and migratory bird 
species, for example. However, there are limitations to the value of laboriously developed 
transboundary agreements on climate change and climate change adaptation, for example. 
Similar limitations appear to apply, as seen in this study, to wolves. Shared goals and problems, 
as opposed to conflict mediation, provide fertile ground for coordination. Italy, Switzerland, and 
the rest of the Alpine Convention share the reality of recolonizing wolves, and general public 
support for protective legislation and wolf presence. So although the Trinational Agreement 
ceased to function, a new framework came into play. Coordinating management in contested 
situations presents larger challenges.   
  
 Institutional path dependency and political tension between management entities are 
primarily responsible for the cessation of the three agreements detailed in this thesis. The State 
of Alaska’s trajectory of institutionalized resistance to taking into account changing state and 
national trends in public opinion is a sign of this path dependence. The NPS, as well has been 
accused of agency drift, for example of managing Yukon-Charley more similarly to a National 
Park than a National Preserve (D. James, personal communication, May 2013). It has been 
suggested that tensions emerge as institutions “bearing the imprint of the past” try to address 
current and future problems (Jacobson C. , 2008; Putnam, 1993). This tension is also evident in 
the Western Alps case study. Wolf recolonization, and increasing wolf population and impacts 
were certainly current, and prospective future, problems at the time the Trinational Agreement 
was created. The trajectory was for national control in a national context. Attempts in the 
Western Alps to coordinate and accept differing approaches created the tension that lead to the 
cessation of the Trinational Agreement. In both the Alaska and Western Alps cases, it is 
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important also to note that entities resisting changes in majority opinions often see their 
position as equitable to the minority.  
 
 Hunters, trappers, and shepherds are a numerical minority in both regions. Many people not 
immediately involved in these activities also value the continued existence of hunters, trappers, 
and shepherds and their lifestyles.  At local, regional and national scales, people idealize 
‘traditional’ lifestyles. These lifestyles partially define places and cultures that broad 
constituencies identify with. 
 
 Ultimate decision makers are usually appointed by administrations with contemporary 
political leanings. Positional survival provides a strong incentive for these decision makers to 
maintain consistency with the administration’s political goals, even if it means institutionalizing 
non-cooperation. This can be seen in present inter-agency (i.e. State versus Federal) conflict 
such as in ADFG’s obstructive participation and non-participation in the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s (FWS) Landscape Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs), discussed below. It also 
exists in interviewees’ recollections of past administrations’ amiability to interagency 
coordination. In all three case studies biologists and field-level managers interviewed expressed 
disappointment about the cessation of the agreements, and the impermissibility of coordinating 
more with their transboundary counterparts. Many field level biologists continue to unofficially 
coordinate with their counterparts (C. Westtin, personal communication, April 2013; D. James, 
personal communication, May 2013). In the words of one higher level manager “Go ahead, work 
with them, just don’t tell me about it” (anonymous, personal communication, May 2013).  
 
 The situation in the preceding paragraph may, in the long term, be a good omen. Though 
higher level appointees are often limited by political agendas, lower ranks are eager to 
cooperate. As Jacobson points out, policy makers are powerful but ephemeral influences on 
agencies (2008). Career professionals are most affected by and aware of gaps between their 
agency and the norms, values, and cultural beliefs of society, whose wildlife they manage 
(Jacobson C. , 2008). They are also in the best position to “pursue a strategy of resistance or 
strategic change” (Jacobson C. , 2008).  
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 Despite their cessation, the three transboundary wolf agreements are hardly meaningless. 
The Yukon-Charley agreement contributed to the solidification of opinions in a regionally, 
politically important audience. The Denali agreement brought local, national, and even 
international attention to the wolf management situation, and is likely to do so again once the 
moratorium passes. The Western Alps agreement led to a public and political consensus that the 
Alpine countries share a single wolf population. The results are not transformational, but they 
are important. The agreements’ ultimate outcomes contribute incrementally to large-picture 
changes.   
  
 Both Alaska and the Western Alps are experiencing a rural to urban human population 
migration. Correspondingly, traditional activities associated with rural lifestyles such as 
subsistence hunting and shepherding face decline. This decline challenges the resilience of 
immediate and peripheral cultures and identities. Opposition to the wolf is symbolic in the Alps 
because the wolf’s resurgence is both a result of and catalyst for rural to urban migration. In 
both the Western Alps and Alaska, support of wolf-control (or opposition to protection) is a  
unifying symbol of rural communities and rural culture against top-down political control and 
the growing urban, ‘environmentalist’ majority (Skogen & Krange, 2003).  
 
 As societal values shift from predominantly utilitarian to a more protectionist orientation 
towards wildlife (Manfredo, Teel, & Bright, 2003), the wolf appears to come along for the ride. 
In the Alps, continuing recolonization seems all but unstoppable under present law and general 
public support. Only an extremely high-impact event (e.g. a pack of wolves eating a 
kindergartner) is likely to lead to serious wolf re-extirpation attempts. Even if public opinion 
reversed course, society has changed since the last extirpation; unregulated, high-intensity 
shooting, trapping, and poisoning wolves is as unlikely as aerial wolf-control in densely 
populated Europe. Re-extirpation would be difficult.  
 
 In Alaska, the increasing cost of aerial control has an inverse relationship with public 
approval of the means. Wolf-control will likely continue indefinitely, on increasingly smaller and 
more irrelevant scales corresponding with available funding, until it goes away. Political will to 
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drastically increase predator control in Alaska only seems likely if the national mood towards 
wolves takes a massive downturn in the face of recolonization in the contiguous states.  
 
 Some transboundary resource issues may require institutional transformation (Kates, Travis, 
& Wilbanks, 2012). I do not believe that to be the case with wolf management. In fact, I believe 
incremental, gradual change is less likely to further marginalize already disenfranchised 
constituents than a radical or abrupt change to the status quo would. Federal versus State 
tension, though unpleasant, keeps contrasting perspectives and questions of equitability at the 
fore. The conversation has to take place, though, and the possibility of transboundary 
coordination should be facilitated.  
 
 Similar in ways to the Alpine Convention, I suggest the US Department of the Interior (DOI)-
initiated Landscape Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) would serve well as an avenue or 
template for transagency, transboundary coordination. LCCs are self-directed, applied science 
partnerships. Participation in LCCs is voluntary, and they have no regulatory authority of their 
own. LCCs seek to address landscape scale threats to biological and cultural resources, too large 
for any one entity or jurisdiction to address alone. Landscapes are loosely delineated by 
ecoregion (stretching into adjacent countries). Agencies and organizations within that region 
may have a seat at an LCC Steering Committee. An agency or organization must generally have 
management or science capacity to have a representative on an LCC Steering Committee.  
 
LCCs are neutral and free of the complications that accompany direct management 
responsibilities. LCCs can provide a valuable, structured platform. LCC partners are reminded of 
their organizations’ regional connectedness, and aware of other organizations’ activities on a 
personal level. LCCs work to identify shared needs and goals among stakeholders. Most 
importantly LCCs are a venue for communication and cross-agency relationship building. There 
are benefits to simply having all parties at the table, each with an equal voice. This is the level 
where agreements and understandings are made.    
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 4.3  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 Wolves make some people intensely emotional. One logical question is whether in the 
context of this emotionality, dispassionate, rational wolf management is possible. Certainly in all 
cases strong positive and negative attitudes towards wolves contributed to the fleetingness of 
wolf management agreements. I argue that each agreement owes its existential brevity to its 
own unique composite of factors. The wolf is one factor, not the factor. Future studies should 
examine the resilience of similar agreement structures regarding other transboundary wildlife. 
Cases should explore controversial and less controversial species, species regularly consumed by 
humans, and species peripherally important to human consumption. Studies should also seek 
out successful, long-lived agreements regarding transboundary wolves, and analyze factors 
leading to success. Such studies have the potential to implicate or exonerate the wolf as 
implicitly unmanageable. 
  
 Where attitudes towards wolves appear most trenchant, they are often projections of 
societal factors (Lopez, 1978). Societal factors such as class, gender, racial, and power related 
struggles provoke strong feelings. These feelings manifested in wolf issues lead to heightened 
emotional responses when the issues are brought to a public venue.  Studies of social and 
cultural projections onto wildlife have been informative, but limited in scope and quantity. 
Likewise, studies of the ecological implications of these projections will continue to be 
important for how wildlife is managed in an inevitably value driven context.  
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